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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION		
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4	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Case No. 21-cr-491		
5	Plaintiff, April 25, 2024		
6	vs. 10:09 a.m.		
7	PAUL SPIVAK, OLGA SMIRNOVA, CHARLES SCOTT,		
8	CHRISTOPHER BONGIORNO,		
9	Defendants.		
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12	TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING PROCEEDINGS		
13	BEFORE THE HONORABLE J. PHILIP CALABRESE		
14	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE		
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20	Official Court Reporter: Susan Trischan, RMR, CRR, FCRR, CRC		
21	7-189 U.S. Court House 801 West Superior Avenue		
22	Cleveland, Ohio 44113 (216) 357-7087		
23	Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography.		
24	Transcript produced by computer-aided transcription.		
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Case	e. 1.21-ci-00491-JPC D0C#. 319 Fil	ed. 05/01/24 2 01 147. PageID #. 3017
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1	THURSDAY, APRIL 25, 2024, 10:09 A.M.
2	THE COURT: Please be seated.
3	Good morning.
4	We're on the record in Case Number
10:09:57 5	1:21-cr-491, the United States of America versus Paul
6	Spivak and others.
7	Counsel, will you please state your
8	appearances for the record?
9	MR. ABREU: Good morning, Your Honor.
10:10:08 10	Assistant U.S. Attorney Alex Abreu for the
11	United States of America, and with me today is FBI
12	Special Agent Anthony Fry.
13	MR. AXELROD: Good morning, Your Honor.
14	David Axelrod along with Lauren Engelmyer
10:10:23 15	on behalf of Paul Spivak.
16	MR. ROSEN: Judge, good morning.
17	Michael Rosen on behalf of Christopher
18	Bongiorno.
19	MR. DeVILLERS: Good morning, Your Honor.
20	David DeVillers on behalf of Charles Scott.
21	MR. McCAFFREY: Your Honor, John McCaffrey
22	and Melissa Kelly on behalf of Olga Smirnova.
23	THE COURT: Well, good morning.
24	We're scheduled today for oral arguments on
10:10:47 25	the various pending motions, which I am still very much

working through, so I look forward to hearing from all of 1 2 you to help me in those efforts. 3 Let me start by telling you how I'm 4 thinking about the motions, which will also tell you how 10:11:09 5 structurally I think it makes sense to proceed this 6 morning. 7 So as I see it -- and I'm speaking in broad strokes here -- I know everyone's captioned their motions 8 9 technically differently so I'm not glossing over that, 10:11:26 10 and I know that will be significant and important as we 11 move forward. 12 But as I see it, there's functionally three 13 groups of motions. 14 There's Rule 12 motions, there's motions to 10:11:41 15 sever, and there's -- I suppose the last group would be 16 what I would call evidentiary motions. I think those are 17 principally the motions to suppress that Mr. Bongiorno 18 filed. 19 And I think that's roughly the order in 10:12:10 20 which I'm approaching them and thinking about them 21 structurally. 22 Of any of the motions to dismiss, I know 23 that one -- I call them Rule 12 motions, but I know the

that one -- I call them Rule 12 motions, but I know the one is pre-indictment delay motions, so again I'm speaking broadly here.

1	I know that if any of those are granted in
2	whole or in part they might have implications down the
3	line.
4	So what I'd like to do is take them in
10:12:36 5	those groupings, starting with the motions to dismiss,
6	and then moving on to the motions to sever, and then that
7	last group of motions, the evidentiary ones, last.
8	Again that's how I'm thinking about them
9	and working through them.
10:12:52 10	So with that, I'll just say one other thing
11	as a preface to apply to all of your remarks and
12	arguments.
13	You can either speak from counsel table in
14	which case please remain seated and speak directly into
10:13:10 15	the microphone, or speak at the podium. Either way, just
16	be sure you're speaking into the microphone for the
17	benefit of our court reporter.
18	So with that, I'd like to turn to the
19	motions to dismiss, and perhaps, Mr. Axelrod, I'll start
10:13:29 20	with you.
21	MR. AXELROD: Great. Thank you, Your
22	Honor.
23	And I'll come up. Old habits die hard.
24	THE COURT: I understand.
10:13:35 25	MR. AXELROD: And the way I think of

course, it's up to you -- but I think probably the way -- and we've talked about this -- the best way to structure it is going sequentially through the motions.

So there's a motion to dismiss Count 1 and the substantive counts related to Count 1. There's a motion to dismiss Count 2 and the substantive counts related to Count 2. And then there's the kind of, I would call them, the obstruction counts like 48 and 50 that are at the end.

I'll be handling Count 1 and the substantive counts, and then I think that Mr. McCaffrey would like to weigh in after I do.

Ms. Engelmyer, who is a senior associate working with me, will be handling Count 2, and then I'll handle the other ones as well.

But, you know, I've done this a lot, Your Honor, I'm not going to go chapter and verse through the briefs because I know that you've read them so I'm going to try to hit the high points, but of course if you have any questions, I'm more than happy to answer those.

So we don't file these motions to dismiss lightly.

And I understand the standard is generally favorable to the Government and to what a grand jury returns, but if you look at Count 1, it's a conspiracy to

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1 commit securities fraud.

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Conspiracy, of course, is its own criminal act. It's an agreement to do something criminal, but that's the rub, right? You've got maybe an agreement to do something criminal.

If you're in agreement to trade stocks, that's not criminal. And so really that's where Count 1 falls apart.

Here, the offense purports that -- the purpose of the conspiracy purports to be to commit securities fraud, but the problem with Count 1 is it does not articulate a theory of securities fraud like a legitimate or articulable legally cognizable theory against Paul Spivak or Olga Smirnova.

And it's really not hard to describe securities fraud.

I mean, securities fraud indictments are filed all over the country all the time, and they generally rest on the idea that the defendants were involved in the conspiracy to somehow mislead investors, whether through false statements or some types of -- some type of false signal or some type of market manipulation.

But this count fails to do all of that, any of that, which suggests an evidentiary problem. And I think that the Government was creatively trying to get

around evidentiary holes in their case by structuring an indictment that uses a lot of -- I'll use the term word salad, but it's probably incorrect.

I mean, if you look at the indictment as I did when I first came on the case, from afar it uses lots of terms that sound in securities fraud. There's a part in the beginning that says pump and dump and then there's a part about Rule 144 letters. These are all common phrases associated with securities fraud.

But when you actually drill down, Count 1 never actually says what the defendants, specifically what my client Paul Spivak, did wrong and what his knowledge was and what his intent was.

THE COURT: Well, is it sufficient for the grand jury to charge a conspiracy to violate federal securities laws, and to leave the specifics of that to be proved at trial?

I mean, I'm not aware of a specific requirement. I mean, it's not a 9(b) civil pleadings standard, for example.

MR. AXELROD: I certainly agree that it's not a 9(b) and 9(b) does not apply here, but I do think that there has to be an articulable theory, a legally cognizable theory of securities fraud that has to be alleged because otherwise, the grand jury returned an

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1 indictment of conspiracy to do something that's legal, 2 which of course is not a crime. 3 THE COURT: Well, so one of the things I've 4 been working through is whether -- so we talked about Count 1, Count 2, and I think again in broad stroke 10:17:15 5 6 perhaps to shorthand it, it should be Count 1 and the 7 substantive related counts, Count 2 and the substantive related counts. 8 9 So at some level does Count 1, to approach 10:17:33 10 your motion and your argument, require turning to the 11 substantive related counts first? 12 And if they charge a violation of federal 13 securities law, then the question becomes is there a 14 conspiracy that's charged? 10:17:47 15 MR. AXELROD: I haven't looked at it that 16 way. I haven't thought about it that way. 17 Generally, the way you see most 18 indictments, the way they're structured is you kind of 19 have Count 1 which sets out the overarching scheme, 10:18:00 20 right? And then the substantive counts refer back to 21 that count and incorporate them. 22 I mean, I think the substantive counts are 23 all plainly infirmed in this case because if you look at 24 them -- and I'm kind of skipping now to the end of my 10:18:12 25 argument -- but if you look at them, I don't know -- and

1 I'm a practitioner of this, and I've been doing this for 2 15 years largely at the U.S. Attorney's Office in 3 Philadelphia and then at the SEC -- I can't tell what 4 Paul Spivak is alleged to have done to violate the securities fraud statutes in the substantive counts, 10:18:26 5 6 which I'll get into by number, and in the wire fraud 7 counts that are attached. But I think that problem is built really in 8 Count 1. So let me jump and I'll give you an 9 10:18:39 10 explanation. 11 So Paragraph 9 talks about a pump and dump, 12 generally. It just kind of lays out the groundwork for 13 what a pump and dump scheme is. 14 But Count 1 never alleges that the 10:18:52 15 defendants were actually engaged in a pump and dump 16 scheme. It never alleges a pump. 17 So, you know, when we talk kind of commonly 18 about a pump, what we're talking about is people 19 generally releasing false information into the market to 10:19:06 20 pump up the stock, to raise up the stock price. 21 Usually that's on message boards on the 22 Internet or it's on Facebook or on Twitter or whatever 23 may have you, but the real key of that is that it's false 2.4 information. 10:19:18 25 Here, if you look at Paragraph 32, this is

really telling, it says Spivak and others --1 2 THE COURT: I'm sorry, which paragraph? 3 MR. AXELROD: Paragraph 32. 4 THE COURT: Thank you. 10:19:29 5 MR. AXELROD: Of the superseding, second 6 superseding indictment. 7 Spivak specific -- Spivak and others arranged to artificially inflate the prices of USLG 8 shares by creating and releasing favorable -- this is the key -- favorable press releases. 10:19:41 10 11 Now, it is not illegal to release favorable 12 press releases. If it were, every publicly traded 13 company in the United States would be indicted because 14 you know that anytime something good happens with 10:19:56 15 Twitter, Meta, whatever stock you may have, they issue a 16 press release because they want people to invest. 17 That's kind of the nature of our market. 18 Releasing favorable press releases is not 19 illegal. 10:20:11 20 It also, the problem with Count 1, is it 21 never alleges a dump. Usually in a pump and dump scheme, 22 the people are holding all the stock, pump up the price, 23 sell it to unsuspecting investors, and then the people 2.4 holding the stock then dump the shares to make money. 10:20:26 25 Well, my client, if you look at the

1 indictment, is never accused of dumping any stock. 2 fact, he owns the majority of USLG, he has because he 3 founded the company, he's poured money into the company. 4 I think he owns like 50 million shares. And he's never alleged to have sold any of them but-for a small few. 10:20:41 5 6 So there's no pump and there's no dump and 7 there's no falsity to drive up the price of the stock, all right, so there's no pump and dump alleged. 8 9 Now, of course, securities fraud can also 10:20:55 10 be premised on making misrepresentations to investors. 11 That's a common scheme you see where people go out and 12 they say, "If you invest in this company, the value of 13 the share is going to go up 200 percent in the next year" 14 or "We've got all these great things going on," and it's all false. 10:21:11 15 16 Here's also where Count 1 falls. If you 17 look at Paragraph 29 of the second superseding indictment 18 it says Mallion and others made material 19 misrepresentations to investors. Well, okay. It does 10:21:26 20 not say Paul Spivak knew about that, encouraged it, was a 21 part of it, had any knowledge. 22 THE COURT: If he's a co-conspirator, that 23 is going to be imputed to him as an evidentiary matter, isn't it? 24 10:21:38 25 MR. AXELROD: I don't -- I don't think so.

1 I mean, I think in most cases where you 2 have co-conspirators involved in a conspiracy, especially 3 one to commit securities fraud, it would say that Spivak 4 encouraged Mallion and others to make misrepresentations 10:21:52 5 to investors. THE COURT: Well, maybe if he's the kingpin 6 7 or what have you. And I understand he's the first charged and 8 9 named defendant so maybe there's some inference or reason 10:22:03 10 to believe that's the case, but all of the actions of the 11 co-conspirators are generally, you know, charged to 12 another. 13 MR. AXELROD: I think that that's right 14 because generally in a conspiracy allegation, it alleges 10:22:18 15 that the co-conspirators had knowledge or it was all 16 reasonable/foreseeable, those actions of the fellow 17 co-conspirators. Here there is no such allegation. 18 19 And I don't think just because it's charged 10:22:31 20 as a conspiracy that you can infer all those actions of 21 some co-conspirators to another. 22 I mean, it's very easy if the evidence 23 supported it, it would be very easy for the Government to 2.4 say that Paul Spivak had knowledge or Paul Spivak 10:22:44 25 encouraged or Paul Spivak knew that it was reasonably

1 likely that these people would go out and make 2 misrepresentations to investors. 3 It doesn't say that because I don't think 4 the evidence supports that. THE COURT: Isn't that an inference from 10:22:55 5 6 some of the allegations where there's text messages and conversations and things like that charged where the 7 focus is really on getting the stock price to certain 8 points, for example, to make payroll and things like 10:23:10 10 that? 11 So isn't a logical consequence of that and 12 in the procedural posture the Government would be 13 entitled to a natural inference that Spivak intends the 14 consequences of that? 10:23:22 15 He doesn't care how the price goes up or he 16 doesn't care how payroll is made; he just wants to make 17 sure that the capital is there, that the trades are 18 there, that the price goes up to allow that? 19 MR. AXELROD: I think that that is an 10:23:38 20 illogical leap based on what's in this indictment. 21 I think there could be certain allegations 22 that would support that, but I don't think that those are 23 found in this indictment. I don't think that it follows that if 24 10:23:47 25 someone is interested in promoting the overall health of

their company, that it follows that they would be aware or aware of or encouraging people selling stock to make misrepresentations to investors.

I mean, and I don't want to talk about the

I mean, and I don't want to talk about the evidence because I know that that's inappropriate. That will be done at a different time, so I'm really trying to stick to the conspiracy.

And really what my bugaboo is about this is that if all what you say is true, Your Honor — and it very well could be — it would be very easy to write that in an indictment, that Mr. Spivak knew, Mr. Spivak encouraged, Mr. Spivak was aware that this was going on.

But all of that's missing from this indictment.

And because of that, I think -- and I'll get to this in a second -- when you flow to the substantive counts, the wire fraud and the securities fraud counts which require knowledge, intent of the specific acts, I think that's where really this, this omission or this absence in Count 1 really becomes exposed.

But, you know, this is an indictment. This is a heavy speaking indictment. There are over a hundred specific overt acts that are discussed in Count 1, and there's no allegations of knowledge of Spivak of any of

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1 those misreps in any of those overt acts. And I think 2 that that absence is as telling as what's actually in the 3 indictment. 4 Because if Mr. Spivak -- I mean, you know, I'll take a step back. 10:25:14 5 6 There's actually no overt act that talks 7 about any of those misrepresentations specifically 8 either. 9 There's this general statement in 10:25:23 10 Paragraph 29 that, you know, Mallion made material 11 misrepresentations, but if on, for instance, December 12 13th of 2016 -- I'm making this up -- that Mr. Mallion said to one investor, "USLG is going through the roof, 13 they're designing the space shuttle," right, obviously 14 that's insane, but if that were in the indictment, that 10:25:39 15 16 would be a very specific material misrepresentation. 17 But none of that's in the indictment 18 either. 19 And so really what it's trying to do, what 10:25:48 20 this indictment does is it talks in generalities about 21 things you generally find in a securities fraud 22 indictment without containing the specifics that I think 23 are required under the law to go forward with a 24 conspiracy of this type. 10:26:07 25 And I'll give you one other example.

one other common type of securities fraud is market manipulation. And now I'm not talking about -- necessarily about a pump and dump but, you know, maybe match trades, painting the wire.

And so if you look at Paragraph 24, there's an allegation that says Mallion, Church and others used manipulative stock trading techniques to artificially inflate the share price of USLG. That's Paragraph 24 of the second superseding indictment.

Again, you don't see any overt acts that talk about this, but more importantly there's no imputation of knowledge, encouragement, anticipation by Spivak anywhere in the indictment.

And so if this is a conspiracy to engage in market manipulation like by sending false signals to investors about volume, about interest, things of that nature, there's nothing that shows that my client had knowledge, participation, encouragement, reasonably anticipated. All of that is absent from Count 1.

And it would be very easy, if the evidence supported it, to include such an allegation. And, you know, again I'm not arguing the evidence, but I think it's very clear that the omissions, the absences in this count demonstrate that there is something underlying this case about why those things could not be included in this

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And I think it's infirmed as it's written, but I think there's an underlying evidentiary problem.

THE COURT: And so one of your arguments is that the Government has not charged kind of a particular recognized theory of securities fraud, or maybe it's mixing and matching and borrowing from both or from multiple of them.

But is there a requirement in the law that they charge one specifically?

MR. AXELROD: Well, there is a requirement that it -- that the crime alleged is specifically precise that a client -- that a defendant could avoid double jeopardy, right?

So, yes, I would say there is. But I think there's also --

THE COURT: At some level from that standard isn't the broader the allegation or charge, the better for your client in the sense that it's notoriously difficult to get convictions in white collar cases for a host of reasons we don't need to go into -- I don't know whether this is such a case or not -- but it seems to me that if it is, that the broader the charge, I mean if the charge is simply this is a 10b-5 violation as alleged, then any conduct that falls within 10b-5 is going to be

1 barred. 2 MR. AXELROD: Yes. I quess that's true. 3 I think this is more of a problem for the 4 substantive counts, but I think that there also is a 10:28:49 5 legal requirement that -- like, I know that the 6 Government loves to say that, "An indictment is 7 sufficient as long as we restate the statute and the elements in the statute." 8 9 I mean, that's not -- that's not quite 10:29:00 10 true. 11 And here, I don't think that this satisfies 12 the Rules. And I'm thinking of the -- one second -- the 13 Hamling case that requires a statement of facts and 14 circumstances demonstrating what the count is. 10:29:14 15 I don't think that it's sufficient under 16 Hamling and also the Howard case, which the Government 17 cites, to simply throw all these -- this word salad of 18 securities fraud terms in an indictment and then say, 19 "You go figure it out." 10:29:27 20 I don't think that's sufficient under the 21 law. I don't think that provides sufficient notice of 22 what the claim is, and I don't think it sufficiently 23 alleges a securities fraud violation. 24 So that's kind of the crux of the Count 1, 10:29:41 25 and then I'll just move into the substantive counts if

1 you're ready for that. 2 THE COURT: Sure. 3 MR. AXELROD: So I mean, I think really the 4 problems with Count 1 -- the lack of specificity, the 10:29:52 5 lack of an overarching theory and the lack of allegations 6 of knowledge, engagement, anticipation -- all those 7 things really come out when you look at the substantive 8 counts. 9 When you look at the securities fraud 10:30:06 10 counts and the wire fraud counts, it is impossible for a 11 practitioner like me to determine what the Government 12 actually alleges is illegal. 13 And so -- I'm just grabbing my indictment. 14 So Count 5, for instance, let's go to Page 35 of the 10:30:25 15 second superseding indictment -- the pincite is 1443 --16 Count 5 just lists October 14th, 2016, 20,000 shares, 17 defendant charged Spivak, proceeds of sale \$5,000. And this actually cross-references to Count 18 19 1 in Paragraph 41-ff, and that is on Page -- I actually 10:30:55 20 forgot to write down the page, but it is on Page --21 THE COURT: I believe it's Page 11 of the 22 second superseding indictment. 23 MR. AXELROD: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. 24 No, 41-ff is --10:31:07 25 THE COURT: Oh, yeah. No, it's not.

I apologize. 1 2 MR. AXELROD: No worries. 3 It's Page 18. 4 And (ff) says that, "On or about October 13th, 2016, Arthur and Bongiorno caused Victim 5 to send 10:31:17 5 6 a check for \$5,000 to USLG account," blah, blah, blah, 7 "for the purchase of USLG shares." There's nothing to do with Spivak in that 8 9 overt act. 10:31:33 10 And then if you go and you look at the 11 securities fraud alleged on Page 35, it says Spivak 12 committed securities fraud and repeats the statute above, but there's no -- you're left guessing what Paul Spivak 13 14 actually did to commit securities fraud with respect to Count 5. 10:31:48 15 16 I mean, you can cross-reference and go back 17 and look, but it doesn't say what Arthur and Bongiorno 18 did either. Did they engage in a pump and dump to get 19 this investor to invest? Did they lie to him about the 10:32:00 20 stock? 21 THE COURT: Well, it sounds like the 22 allegation is that the investor was defrauded as part of 23 the conspiracy. 24 So I kind of go back to isn't the 10:32:10 25 conspiracy charge -- you know, doesn't that suffice to

1 sweep that alleged misconduct in? 2 MR. AXELROD: I don't -- I don't think so 3 because, I mean, to be quilty of securities fraud, you 4 have to have knowledge and intent. It does not anywhere in this indictment 10:32:25 5 6 state specifically on Page 35 what Spivak had knowledge 7 of, what he intended to do. And then if you cross-reference it back to 8 Count 1, that's also missing there. 9 10:32:45 10 It does not indicate what was illegal. It 11 does not state Spivak's knowledge. I mean, you're just 12 left quessing and I'm still quessing. I don't know. 13 I've looked at discovery. I've looked at this indictment 14 a million times. I don't know. 10:33:01 15 I mean, I'm quessing that I won't know 16 until trial, and to me that's a problem with the 17 indictment. A criminal defendant should not be left 18 quessing. 19 THE COURT: Well, isn't that more of a 10:33:12 20 problem with the criminal justice system at large? 21 I mean, I can tell you any number of cases 22 where defense lawyers have told me they didn't know what 23 the theory of the prosecution was until the key witness 2.4 took the stand. 10:33:26 25 I would say it shouldn't be that way.

	1	That's why we have discovery in civil cases. I don't
	2	know why we don't have depositions and so forth in
	3	criminal cases. That's a different problem we're not
	4	going to solve today.
10:33:36	5	MR. AXELROD: I agree, and I'm not I do
	6	think it is a problem, but I'm not attacking the criminal
	7	justice system at large because I think in most cases
	8	take a drug case.
	9	THE COURT: It's okay if you do, but we're
10:33:47 1	_0	just not going to solve that today.
1	.1	MR. AXELROD: Yeah, but I recognize I'm
1	_2	talking to a Judge and not a Congressman or a Senator or
1	_3	the President, so I'm appealing to the person I'm
1	_4	speaking to.
10:33:57 1	. 5	But if you're talking about a drug case or
1	- 6	a gun case or a threats case, right, you allege a date
1	-7	and place, that's sufficient, right?
1	- 8	When you're talking about securities fraud
1	9	where you're dealing with an incredibly broad statute, I
10:34:09 2	20	think it behooves Federal Judges in your position to help
2	21	defendants out.
2	22	I think the law requires it.
2	23	And I know that some Judges aren't
2	24	THE COURT: It's not clear to me from that
10:34:17 2	25	standard what more specificity you want.

1 You have a Victim 5, so presumably you have 2 some ability to make an identification on that, but even 3 if you don't, you have a specific date, financial 4 institution, and so forth. 10:34:31 5 I'm not sure what else can be -- you have a number of shares and so on. 6 7 MR. AXELROD: Well, yes, you have a victim, you have a date. But what's the fraud is really my 8 9 problem. 10:34:43 10 Well, if he was lied to, what was the lie? 11 If my client knew about it, say my client knew about it, 12 but this indictment doesn't say that. 13 And I do think that there is a requirement 14 in the law, if you look at the cases, for the Government to say what the fraud was. And I don't know why this 10:34:58 15 16 indictment doesn't do so. 17 And I think that this problem gets even 18 worse when you look at the other securities fraud counts 19 that aren't even cross-referenced in the indictment. 10:35:11 20 So if you look at Counts 6 through 12 and 21 18 through 19, there is no cross-reference to any of the 22 100 overt acts in the indictment. 23 I have no idea what those are premised on 2.4 besides someone investing. Don't know who talked to 10:35:33 25 them, don't know why they invested, don't know what the

1 alleged theory of those, those crimes are. 2 I mean, we really are left quessing, but 3 again forget quessing. This indictment does not allege 4 that Spivak had knowledge, intent with respect to those, 10:35:50 5 those instances. 6 I mean, it says it generally when it 7 repeats the statutory language, but it wouldn't be hard 8 for an indictment -- and I don't think this is asking more than what the law requires -- for the indictment to 10:36:01 10 say that on September 16th, for instance, of 2016, this 11 person misrepresented something to Investor A and Spivak 12 knew about it. 13 THE COURT: But you're not asking for any 14 more specificity with respect to the particular kinds of 10:36:18 15 crimes charged in the second superseding indictment than 16 any other criminal charge generally. 17 MR. AXELROD: No. No. 18 Just want to know --19 THE COURT: You're not -- you're not saying 10:36:30 20 there's a 95 Reform Act for securities fraud on the 21 criminal side as well is all I'm trying to get at. 22 MR. AXELROD: Correct. That is absolutely 23 right. I'm not -- I'm not saying that. 24 I'm just saying that this does not meet the

standards that are required to give due notice to a

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1 defendant of what he's been charged with. 2 Is there a tissue, Your Honor? Thank you 3 very much. 4 And the problem with this is I do think there's a double jeopardy issue with these substantive 10:37:03 5 6 counts, right? 7 Because let's say there's no statute of limitations issue, let's be hypothetical here, but let's 8 9 say with Count 5 that the Government went to trial and 10:37:17 10 their theory with respect to Count 5 was that Arthur, 11 this person Arthur lied to this investor and that 12 investor invested. 13 Okay, jury comes back not quilty. 14 There's nothing preventing the Government, 10:37:30 15 based on this substantive count, from coming forward and 16 saying, "Okay, we're kidding, he actually invested 17 because of the pump and dump scheme because he was misled 18 based on what he read on the Internet." 19 There's nothing in this that I think would 10:37:43 20 prevent that argument from going forward. 21 THE COURT: I'm not -- I mean, I understand 22 your argument. I'm not sure I agree with that given the 23 way the Government has charged it. 24 I mean, I think charging the 10b-5 is going 10:37:54 25 to broadly encompass the various theories that the

Government has, you know, not in your view alleged. 1 2 So I think they would be, you know, bound 3 or precluded under each of them, especially with a 4 general verdict. MR. AXELROD: Okay. But there's -- I mean, 10:38:08 5 6 there's a second problem, too, that I have not raised, but I thought about last night. 7 Because of how broad this is, and because I 8 think it's insufficient, the grand jury may have indicted 9 Count 5 based on the notion that this investor was misled 10:38:20 10 11 in a verbal or oral conversation. 12 But at trial, the Government could 13 say -- could decide that maybe the evidence isn't great 14 on that point any more, and could shift its focus to a 10:38:35 15 market manipulation theory. 16 I think that would be an unlawful, 17 unconstitutional variance from what the -- from what the 18 grand jury indicted, and I think that because of the lack 19 of specificity in the indictment, we're really opening up 10:38:47 20 the possibility of error. 21 Now, largely my arguments about substantive 22 wire fraud are the same. For wire fraud, the Government 23 must prove the defendant said something false. It's impossible for me to determine, with the wire fraud 24

counts, what Mr. Spivak is alleged to have done to commit

10:39:05 25

wire fraud, really in all of the counts.

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And there's another problem, and I know that we argued about this in our initial brief. It appears — but I don't know again because the indictment doesn't say so — that a portion of the Government's theory is this idea of undisclosed broker payments; that there was an omission by brokers, that they did not tell investors that there would be broker commissions.

And if you look at the wire fraud counts,

I'll throw one out at you -- well, I won't throw one out

at you; I'll just tell you -- it looks like there's a

number of wire fraud counts that allege a commission

payment going to a broker for bringing in a share of

stock, a sale of stock.

We submitted cases -- there's the Skelly case out of New York and actually the case the Government submitted out of the Ninth Circuit is aligned -- an omission is not a fraud unless there's a fiduciary duty or a duty to speak.

With the relationship between the brokers alleged in this indictment and the investors, there is no fiduciary duty so there, I mean --

THE COURT: There is a line of cases, at least on the civil side -- I haven't had a chance yet to run it down on the criminal side of securities fraud --

1 that that might be true unless and until you open your 2 mouth and speak, at which point you have a duty to 3 disclose all material information. 4 So I mean, does that line of cases come into play on the criminal side? 10:40:37 5 MR. AXELROD: I mean, I think it does, 6 7 right? An omission -- a material omission can make 8 an overt statement false, right? 9 10:40:48 10 So hypothetically, if one of these brokers 11 said -- well, this would be an outright lie, but if one 12 of these brokers said that there's no commission 13 payments, right, then the omission that there was would be false. 14 10:41:02 15 But here there's no such allegation in the 16 indictment. So you are correct, Your Honor, about that 17 line of cases, but I don't think that even comes into 18 play because there's no allegation that there was any 19 duty to speak here because of what was said. 10:41:13 20 THE COURT: And I should ask this. 21 I have not had a chance to keep up with 22 news this week. I believe the Supreme Court decided an 23 omission case this week. 24 Does that have any -- first of all, is that 10:41:24 25 right? And second of all, if so, does it have any

1	bearing on this?
2	MR. AXELROD: Your Honor, I was in trial
3	the last two weeks in Arizona.
4	THE COURT: So you're in the same boat I
10:41:33 5	am.
6	MR. AXELROD: Unfortunately, I am.
7	THE COURT: Okay.
8	MR. AXELROD: And we talked about, but I
9	just haven't had a chance to look at it.
10:41:38 10	THE COURT: I have not either.
11	MR. AXELROD: I don't think that Supreme
12	Court case is a significant shift in the law, but I'm
13	ignorant so I'll be quiet about that now.
14	THE COURT: Okay.
10:41:45 15	MR. AXELROD: But because of this, this
16	broker issue, I mean if, if that is what the Government's
17	theory is with respect to the wire fraud and the
18	securities fraud cases, then I think that there's another
19	significant issue that I haven't touched on yet that the
10:42:02 20	grand jury was not accurately or adequately advised of
21	the law regarding the Government's theory.
22	And
23	THE COURT: And so that's the issue on
24	which you're seeking the disclosure under Rule 6 of the
10:42:15 25	instruction?

1 MR. AXELROD: Partially. 2 Primarily we're seeking that with respect 3 to the Count 2 and the entrapment instruction. 4 But what worries me more about this is that 10:42:26 5 because of the lack of, I think, sufficiency of the 6 indictment, we can't tell what the Government's theory 7 is, so it's possible that the grand jury was adequately instructed, but it's possible they weren't. 8 9 We just can't tell. 10:42:41 10 And again, you run into issues of variance. You run into issues of improper instructions. And this 11 12 all flows from the fact that it is not difficult to 13 construct an indictment that actually says what the 14 allegations are and what the theory is. 10:42:55 15 And for some reason this is -- this 16 indictment, I think, is intentionally vaque and 17 intentionally lacking in specifics I think because the 18 facts don't support it, but it really does cause a huge 19 notice problem and creates all types of ancillary legal 10:43:10 20 problems for my client. 21 That's it. 22 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 23 Why don't we stick with Count 1 before 2.4 turning to Count 2? 10:43:19 25 So if there's anyone else who, on the

1 defense side, who wants to argue on Count 1. 2 MR. McCAFFREY: Good morning, Your Honor. John McCaffrey on behalf of Olga Smirnova. 3 4 As the Court is aware, Ms. Smirnova is only 10:43:47 5 charged in two counts in this indictment, Count 1 and 6 Count 2, both conspiracy counts. 7 I'm going to focus on Count 1 right now, 8 Your Honor. 9 Count 1 covers a four-year time period from 10:44:01 10 2016 through 2019. And as this Court is well-aware, 11 conspiracy is an inchoate offense which requires facts 12 from the Government demonstrating a specific intent of a 13 specific defendant to commit an offense, to enter into an 14 agreement to commit an offense. 10:44:22 15 I echo -- and Ms. Smirnova is not charged 16 in any of the substantive securities fraud counts that 17 accompany Count 1. I echo Mr. Axelrod's issue that there 18 is insufficient notice being given to Ms. -- to his 19 client, but even more so to Ms. Smirnova who is only 10:44:43 20 charged with a conspiracy. 21 I, again, I can't tell what the theory of 22 the prosecution is, and I think the biggest issue here is 23 what was -- what was the explanation that was given to 24 the grand jurors as to what it was that Ms. Smirnova was

agreeing to enter into.

10:45:03 25

1 What was the nature of the theory of the 2 securities fraud that she was agreeing to, you know, 3 enter into an agreement to advance the commission of 4 those offenses? There is no notice as to any specific 10:45:19 5 6 statements or conduct constituting the formation of the 7 agreement that involved Ms. Smirnova. The mere fact of being married to one of 8 9 the defendants, the mere fact of working at the same 10:45:39 10 company as one of the defendants, as this Court knows, is 11 wholly insufficient. 12 There's no facts demonstrating that she engaged in any specific conduct demonstrating her 13 14 knowledge of a specific securities fraud scheme. 10:46:00 15 And I want to just quickly point out to the 16 Court why this is problematic for the Government, and I 17 want to direct the Court to a series of overt acts that 18 are alleged in Count 41. 19 The Count 41, as it relates to 10:46:20 20 Ms. Smirnova, identifies only ten text messages involving 21 communications which the Government alleges establish 22 Ms. Smirnova's knowledge of the specific object and 23 purpose of the conspiracy. 2.4 Six of those ten text messages include 10:46:42 25 exchanges with several other individuals, and

1 Ms. Smirnova happens to be one of the people that is
2 included on the text.
3 And the six text messages -- six of those

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text messages all occur in a fairly tight time frame in September of 2016, and then the sixth text message is in November of 2016.

This is a four-year conspiracy, Your Honor. And these are these six text messages that don't show that she saw or read the text message, that she acted on the text message, that she had an understanding of the subject matter that was being discussed in the text message, or that she engaged in any conduct before or after showing some form of knowledge.

I mean, I -- I think the Court can take judicial notice of, you know, just because you're included on a text message does not necessarily mean that you read it or understood what was -- what was being discussed.

THE COURT: From a charging standpoint, though, isn't that a fact question to be argued to a jury?

MR. McCAFFREY: It is, but I think that from the stage that we're at right now, the Government has to at least establish what the evidence is that she entered into a conspiratorial agreement.

1	Just because she's on a text message does
2	not establish that basic requirement.
3	I want to talk about so I talked about
4	the six text messages of the ten that just include her on
10:48:23 5	it. There's four text messages in Paragraph 41 where she
6	does have communications and does respond.
7	All of those, each of those four text
8	messages is with a specific individual that's Laura Lesh
9	who was the Vice President of Finance and Administration.
10:48:45 10	She's a woman that is very knowledgeable about
11	securities. She's got a she has a Series 7 license, a
12	Series 52 and a 63 license.
13	THE COURT: Isn't Ms. Smirnova during this
14	time the Chief Operating Officer, or do I have that
10:49:00 15	wrong?
16	MR. McCAFFREY: She's I don't know that
17	she's the Chief Operating Officer.
18	She is essentially a purchasing agent at
19	this time.
10:49:07 20	THE COURT: She's a senior executive,
21	however you cut it.
22	MR. McCAFFREY: I mean, she is yeah, I
23	mean she's, I guess, as senior as you can be in a small
24	company like USLG.
10:49:21 25	But the first text message, Paragraph 41-xx

1 occurs on April 12th, and it's a text message mentioning 2 Mr. Mallion and USLG shares, and they're talking about 3 how they are going to see Richard on Friday. 4 Well, Your Honor, and again we raise in, I think, in particular with respect to Count 2 the issue of 10:49:49 5 context and how was this, how was this portrayed to the 6 7 jury. What's going on is April -- April 12th is 8 there's a proceeding coming up. There's a proceeding 9 10:50:02 10 that was filed in Lake County where Mr. Mallion was sued, 11 and this relates to the fact that they're going to see 12 him, and apparently he has a proposal connected with that 13 lawsuit. 14 That has nothing to do with the securities 10:50:16 15 fraud conspiracy. 16 The second text --17 THE COURT: I mean, I quess as I look at 18 the text message, I mean, I take the point that it's out 19 of context. 10:50:25 20 MR. McCAFFREY: Yes. 21 THE COURT: And I mean, that ultimately 22 seems to be a fact question; not a -- not a question of 23 sufficiency of the indictment under the governing 2.4 standard. 10:50:35 25 MR. McCAFFREY: I think it's a -- I think

1 it goes to how was this explained to the grand jury in 2 the context of this defendant, Ms. Smirnova, is involved 3 in a -- she entered into an agreement to violate 4 securities fraud. 10:50:50 5 THE COURT: Well, I mean, apparently the 6 grand jury believed that there was probable cause that the proposal was not what you're arguing but a proposal 7 for a coordinated activity to manipulate the stock price 8 for the purpose under 10b-5 of defrauding investors or 10:51:05 10 manipulating the market. 11 MR. McCAFFREY: I submit, Your Honor, I 12 don't know that they had any understanding of it. 13 But let's go to the next two text messages, 14 which both occur in October 23rd, 2017 and involve an 10:51:19 15 exchange again with Laura Lesh. 16 And the first one, Paragraph 41-ddd, this 17 is talking about information from DTC. 18 Your Honor, that refers -- DTC eligibility 19 is essentially a depository --10:51:38 20 THE COURT: Right. 21 MR. McCAFFREY: -- and is trying to 22 determine whether or not they can check with DTC to 23 determine whether or not they can see who it is that is 24 essentially trading or trading in these securities, and 10:51:54 25 that gets to the NOBO designation which is the

1 Non-Objecting Beneficial Owner. 2 If that particular owner doesn't object to 3 being disclosed on the DTC depository, then you could 4 find out who it is, but Laura Lesh --THE COURT: I mean, it sounds like -- I 10:52:15 5 6 mean, I think what Mr. Abreu would say, I'm not 7 saying -- I mean, this is a fact question ultimately it seems to me, but it sounds like one plausible 8 9 interpretation of that is that it's enforcement activity 10:52:28 10 where Ms. Smirnova, at the direction of Mr. Spivak or 11 others in a conspiracy, are trying to figure out who's 12 acting at cross-purposes. 13 MR. McCAFFREY: But how does -- how is 14 that, Your Honor, conduct demonstrating her specific 10:52:45 15 intent to enter into a conspiracy to violate the 16 securities statutes? 17 That's what I'm getting at is where is the 18 proof of the specific intent? 19 The only way I can divine that is through 10:52:59 20 looking at the specific overt acts alleged. 21 And I'll go to the last one, Your Honor, 22 because I think this is -- this is really a very 23 important one when we talk about context, and that's 24 Paragraph 41-eee -- I'm sorry -- 41-ttt, which is on 10:53:20 25 April 12th of 2018.

1 And it's talking about Ms. Lesh says that 2 she has sold her USLG shares, and Ms. Smirnova says, "I'm 3 glad you did it." 4 What's not explained is Ms. Lesh left in November of 2017. There are a series of many e-mails 10:53:39 5 6 between these two. They stayed in touch. They both had 7 babies at the same time. And it just so happens this, this 8 9 conversation with this reference occurs ten days after 10:54:04 10 Ms. Lesh had already sold her 25 units of USLG shares 11 that she was granted back in 2016 as part of her package. 12 She was granted these shares as part of her employment 13 package. 14 And, I mean, what would you expect? "Oh, good for you, I'm glad you did, it's already done," but 10:54:23 15 16 none of that context is presented here. 17 It's offered to the grand jury as just raw 18 meat to this is evidence of specific intent to enter into 19 a conspiracy. 10:54:41 20 And importantly, there are, and the 21 Government produced in discovery, there are many texts 22 between the time that Ms. Lesh left USLG in November of 23 2017 up through this conversation in April of 2018. There is no discussion about USLG shares, there's no 24 10:55:07 25 discussion whatsoever. If there was, you'd surely see it

1	here, but there's nothing.
2	This is completely taken out of context.
3	So, Your Honor, I go back again to the
4	sufficiency of the evidence as it relates to this
10:55:23 5	particular defendant, Ms. Smirnova's specific intent to
6	enter into a conspiracy.
7	There is nothing in the overt acts that
8	demonstrates that she entered into a conspiracy to
9	violate the securities laws.
10:55:35 10	Thank you.
11	THE COURT: All right. Were you getting up
12	a moment ago, Mr. Rosen, on Count 1?
13	MR. ROSEN: May I, Your Honor?
14	THE COURT: Yes.
10:55:54 15	MR. DeVILLERS: Just briefly, there's a
16	couple things I want to point out, that my client
17	Mr. Scott in Count 1 is that there's these general
18	allegations in the first paragraph of Count 1, and then
19	every overt act after that with my client is just
10:56:09 20	buying/selling stock and wiring money.
21	Nowhere in there does it talk about any
22	sort of material misrepresentation or knowledge of
23	material misrepresentation to stockholders or to would-be
24	stockholders.
10:56:25 25	THE COURT: There was some allegations in

1	the second superseding indictment, at least two that I
2	remember, that the last trade of the day was specifically
3	made to raise the stock price from, you know, whatever,
4	from 18 cents to 29 cents, or whatever the case may be.
10:56:41 5	Was that were those allegations
6	involving transactions that Mr. Scott was involved in?
7	I just don't recall that specifically.
8	MR. DeVILLERS: I don't believe they were.
9	That was 2016.
10:57:01 10	MR. AXELROD: Yeah. Those allegations
11	relate to Church; not Scott.
12	MR. DeVILLERS: Yes. Yes.
13	THE COURT: Fair enough. Yes.
14	That's thank you. That's the question I
10:57:10 15	was trying to ask, which defendant was charged or
16	implicated in those trades.
17	MR. DeVILLERS: Yeah, the trades that are
18	referred to here
19	THE COURT: And the fact that you're
10:57:20 20	struggling in response to my question suggests that it
21	was not Mr. Scott.
22	MR. DeVILLERS: Yes.
23	There are
24	THE COURT: I suspect you would have it at
10:57:27 25	your fingertips if it were.

	1	MR. DeVILLERS: Yes. I understand, Your
	2	Honor.
	3	So buying and selling stock, there's no
	4	indication, other than the general first paragraph saying
10:57:34	5	he knew about this scheme to misrepresent the purchases
	6	of stock.
	7	Do you have any questions from me, Judge?
	8	THE COURT: All right. No, that was my
	9	primary one.
10:57:49	LO	Thank you.
1	L1	MR. ROSEN: Good morning, Your Honor.
1	L2	May I be the first to nominate you to the
1	L3	Federal Judicial Rules Committee so we can impose some
1	L 4	depositions?
10:58:02	L5	THE COURT: I don't know what I've done to
1	L 6	offend you to put me in that position so.
1	L7	MR. ROSEN: Caught my attention is what you
1	L8	did.
1	L 9	Judge, the case that you were referring to,
10:58:11 2	20	I'm going to spell it, it's Macquarie, the Supreme Court
2	21	case that just came out this week, it's Macquarie
2	22	Infrastructure, M-A-C-Q-U-A-R-I-E, versus Moab, M-O-A-B,
2	23	and it was a couple weeks ago, April 12th, 2024.
2	24	THE COURT: I guess I've been busier longer
10:58:31 2	25	than I thought. I would have thought it was at the end

1	of last week or the beginning of this week, so I'm really
2	falling behind.
3	My apologies.
4	MR. ROSEN: No. No.
10:58:38 5	It does discuss 10b-5 and it does discuss
6	fraud and it does discuss the fact actually it's a
7	unanimous decision which really
8	THE COURT: I think that was a civil case,
9	wasn't it?
10:58:49 10	MR. ROSEN: It was a civil case, that's
11	correct.
12	And it speaks to a defendant, in this case
13	a company, cannot be guilty of fraud where they failed to
14	speak if they had no duty to speak.
10:59:00 15	And so in
16	THE COURT: I mean, it caught my attention
17	earlier in discussing with Mr. Axelrod because of the
18	brokerage commission point.
19	MR. ROSEN: Correct. I agree.
10:59:16 20	And I do think that it may have some
21	application here. I'm not sure to a motion to dismiss,
22	but I read it so it caught my attention as to the
23	application in this case, albeit a civil case.
24	THE COURT: The issue occurred to me, and I
10:59:28 25	said I have to read that before today, and here we are.

1	MR. ROSEN: Now you don't.
2	THE COURT: Well, now I have to read it
3	after today.
4	MR. ROSEN: Your Honor, the only thing I'm
10:59:36 5	going to add to any of this is that I have a pending
6	motion to adopt these arguments.
7	THE COURT: Yes. Yes.
8	MR. ROSEN: And I just to want make sure
9	the Court grants it so I've got an argument to be to
10:59:47 10	be a part of this. I'm not going to
11	THE COURT: Yeah, I'll give you the spoiler
12	alert now.
13	I'm going to grant all of those motions
14	just so that everyone's record is preserved.
10:59:56 15	MR. ROSEN: I'll stop talking.
16	Thanks, Judge.
17	THE COURT: Fair enough.
18	All right. On Count 1, Mr. Abreu, any
19	response on your part?
11:00:06 20	MR. ABREU: Just briefly, Your Honor.
21	Your Honor, I think our response in
22	opposition covers most of what the defendants have argued
23	today and what they've written, and basically my point
24	and my argument is that the defendants would like to
11:00:33 25	expand the requirements that of what is sufficient to

1 plead a criminal charge in a criminal case. 2 This is not a civil case. As the Court 3 knows, this, on a 371 conspiracy, so for Count 1 and 4 Count 2, the Government was -- needs to prove one overt 11:00:54 5 act. 6 I have to allege one overt act, and we 7 alleged over a hundred. THE COURT: On the part of any 8 9 co-conspirator. 11:01:02 10 MR. ABREU: On the part of any 11 co-conspirator; not every co-conspirator. 12 The Government does not need to put in 13 specific factual allegations and specifically say that a specific conspirator knew exactly what this other person 14 11:01:17 15 was doing to -- for that person to be guilty or for that 16 person to be charged. 17 THE COURT: I think, as I read through the 18 briefs that the defendants have filed and as I listen to 19 their arguments today, I think I primarily have two, two concerns that I struggle with or -- and I'm still working 11:01:34 20 21 through, as you can tell. 22 One is whether -- because I've seen this in 23 other cases -- one is whether the grand jury is 24 approaching a very -- a fact pattern that's not one with 11:02:02 25 which you deal every day as a layperson. Right?

This is not necessarily -- it's more, more
in the nature of regulatory Mallum Prohibitum than Mallum

In Se, although, you know, depending on the nature of
the fraud -- and I get that there's some allegations here
that that could be taken to a level of Mallum In Se, but
let's set that to the side.

So in a complex set of financial

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transactions that a grand jury is not day-in and day-out going to be familiar with from their everyday lives, I have some concern that -- and Mr. Axelrod spoke a bit to this -- but, you know, the concern is just is this conduct unseemly but not illegal, and is the grand jury returning indictments for wholly legal, if -- you know, you don't want to look too hard at the sausage-making sometimes, but, you know, are they charging the violation of a criminal law based on perfectly legal conduct?

MR. ABREU: So, Your Honor, I think the best response to that is to look at the elements of securities fraud, the way it's charged.

And the first element is that the defendant knowingly, either employed a -- basically a scheme or made any untrue statement or omitted a material fact necessary to make the statement made true during the course of the sale of a security, in connection with a purchase of a security that used interstate commerce, and

1 acted with the intent to defraud. 2 So really it's the intent to defraud and a 3 false statement. 4 Grand juries deal with that all the time. That is the bread and butter of fraud. 11:03:55 5 At the very beginning, Mr. Axelrod's 6 7 argument makes it appear that there's only three types of ways that you can commit securities fraud. That's 8 9 absolutely wrong. There's infinite ways to commit securities 11:04:09 10 It just has to have a lie with an intent to 11 fraud. 12 defraud in connection with the purchase of a security. 13 That's really what you need. That's what 10b-5 requires 14 and that is what fraud requires. That's what's required 11:04:28 15 for wire fraud, bank fraud. 16 The difference between all of those crimes 17 are usually one element related to here it was in 18 connection with the purchase or sale of a security. 19 In bank fraud, it's that it was to obtain 11:04:44 20 bank property or affected a bank. 21 In wire fraud, it's that you used a wire. 22 In mail fraud, it's that you needed a 23 mailing. 2.4 All the same requirements in terms of 11:04:54 25 falsity.

So I don't think that this is particularly 1 2 hard for a grand jury to grasp because as soon as you say 3 fraud, what you're really talking about is there a lie 4 and did the person act with the intent to defraud. 5 THE COURT: Well, I quess part of that and 11:05:08 6 some of the concerns that the defendants are raising is that there's some cherry-picking going on, there's 7 certain statements that are being taken out of context 8 and, you know, if you look at one line of a text message 11:05:22 10 it sounds pretty bad, but if you put it into a broader 11 context. 12 So I mean, what's ultimately the way to 13 police that? 14 Do you have to impanel a jury? I mean, 11:05:33 15 that's an awfully heavy burden for any defendant. 16 MR. ABREU: Your Honor, to police 17 cherry-picking in terms of an indictment and what 18 language the Government chooses to put in the indictment, 19 Your Honor, the grand jury has a fair amount of latitude 11:05:52 20 to consider what it considers. It's done in secrecy. 21 And unless the defendants meet the high bar 22 of actually showing that there is some irregularity, not 23 just some "We don't know what the grand jury did because 24 we don't like the way that this is alleged so give us the 11:06:12 25 grand jury transcripts," Courts see that all the time and reject those arguments because the grand jury is afforded that deference to conduct and exercise its role to find that there's probable cause and to determine who to charge and who not to charge.

Your Honor, the -- whether -- what's in the indictment is policed by the Court ultimately.

I haven't had a trial with you yet, Judge, and so I don't know if you allow the indictment to go back with the jury. Lots of Courts don't.

The indictment is not evidence. There's a jury instruction expressly on the indictment not being evidence.

Most jurors never see the indictment. The indictment is simply to put the defendants on notice of what they're charged with, and doesn't require the amount of the specificity that the defendants claim that is required here.

I'm going to struggle moving through the second superseding indictment again, but I guess when I look at Page 35, Page ID 1443, this is the Count 5 example that Mr. Axelrod was working through earlier, I mean he says, you know, other than the fact that on the line and the table identifying Mr. Spivak as the defendant charged in Count 5, there's no connection to Mr. Spivak whatsoever

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when you trace it through.

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So what -- what from a notice perspective, what knowledge does he actually have so that he can be prepared on the trial date to meet that allegation?

MR. ABREU: Your Honor, aside from the factual allegations that are incorporated into the counts, it's that the defendant, Paul Spivak, had the knowledge and used the instruments of interstate commerce to employ a device, made a -- you know, the A, B and C of 10b-5, and that gives him the exact notice of what it is that he's alleged of doing, the date that the act occurred on October 14th, it was 20,000 shares, and there was \$5,000 proceeds of that stock sale.

THE COURT: And in the context of a conspiracy charge, I understand that this is the substantive charge that's related, so presumably if, when you trace it through, if Mr. Spivak is not directly involved with that transaction, he'd be involved as a member of the conspiracy as charged.

But it's a little bit hard for Mr. Axelrod to sit down with his client and Mr. Axelrod says, "Come on, sir, you must have some knowledge." He says, "No, look, I don't know, on October 14th I was in France," or whatever it was, "Like, I wasn't involved in this," so it becomes a little bit — I mean, you understand the

1	problem from the trial preparation side.
2	MR. ABREU: I do, Your Honor.
3	But looking at the incorporated
4	allegations, Paul Spivak is the CEO of the company. He
11:09:18 5	is at the top of this conspiracy as alleged in the
6	indictment.
7	He is the one who was issuing the stock.
8	He is the one with the relationships and hired
9	the what was the language he used in his advertisement
11:09:34 10	on Craigslist? He needed
11	THE COURT: He needed Wolves of Wall
12	Street.
13	MR. ABREU: Wolves of Wall Street and
14	bullshit artists, right? He's the person who recruited
11:09:44 15	these individuals, so yes.
16	10b-5, 78j(b), the Title 15 offense,
17	includes aider and abettor liability. There is a
18	conspiracy, and so he is that's why Paul Spivak is
19	charged with most of these counts.
11:10:05 20	And, frankly, many defendants can be
21	charged with these counts. It's just that the grand jury
22	indicted Mr. Spivak on all of the counts that they
23	indicted him on.
24	Could others be indicted for them? Yes.
11:10:19 25	Could Ms. Smirnova be indicted for several of these

1 counts? Absolutely. Was she? No. Is that a decision that the Government and 2 3 the grand jury -- the Government made to present to the 4 grand jury and the grand jury ultimately made? Yes. 11:10:30 5 Is that permissible? It happens all the 6 time, Your Honor. THE COURT: So let me -- on -- since you 7 mentioned Ms. Smirnova, let me, you know, raise one issue 8 9 or concern there. 11:10:42 10 This is not necessarily a question that 11 goes to sufficiency of the charge or the second 12 superseding indictment necessarily, but you would agree that at least on the face of the indictment there's a lot 13 14 less implicating her or directly involving her. 11:11:02 15 MR. ABREU: There is, Your Honor. 16 And an exercise of prosecutorial discretion 17 limited her to two counts with five years stat maxes for 18 a particular reason. 19 That's my decision to make, the United 11:11:19 20 States' decision to make in terms of asking the grand 21 jury to return an indictment against Ms. Smirnova. 22 Could we have charged her with more? Yes. 23 Could we have proved those charges? I think we can, but 2.4 we elected not to. And what we include in the indictment is a 11:11:31 25

1	mere drop in the bucket in terms of the evidence that's
2	been provided to the defendants in discovery.
3	THE COURT: Was it was it four
4	terabytes? Do I remember that right, or am I confusing
11:11:48 5	that with a different case?
6	MR. ABREU: It's about four terabytes. It
7	could be anywhere from two-and-a-half to four terabytes,
8	depending on how it's broken out.
9	THE COURT: What's a terabyte amongst
11:11:58 10	friends?
11	MR. ABREU: Right.
12	But hundreds of text messages.
13	Ms. Smirnova is constantly text messaging back with the
14	Wolf of Wall Street types with Ms. Lesh.
11:12:10 15	Those, all of that, evidentiary issues. I
16	mean, Mr. McCaffrey said it, this is his issue is
17	that, you know, he doesn't believe there's enough
18	evidence for the grand jury to have properly indicted
19	Ms. Smirnova.
11:12:25 20	Again, he's arguing evidence. He's not
21	arguing that the indictment is insufficient or I mean,
22	they are arguing that, but they're blurring the line and
23	really arguing that the evidence is insufficient.
24	The if this were the upside down from
11:12:47 25	stranger things, right, the other side of these motions

1 are motions for Bills of Particular, right? "I don't 2 understand what I'm charged with. Give me more detail." 3 And this indictment gives them the exact 4 detail, a lot more detail than many conspiracy 11:13:03 5 indictments, by providing them with the types of 6 activities that they did, how they manipulated the USLG 7 stock, and what companies they used to do it, and then lots of examples in terms of the overt acts that they 8 9 used to accomplish those objects. I'm not sure what else the defendants 11:13:19 10 11 really want aside from an entire roadmap that would lay 12 out these are the three ways you -- these are the only 13 three ways you could be convicted of this crime because 14 you did X, Y and Z. 11:13:40 15 And that's just not the case. 16 THE COURT: So the other issue I wanted to 17 have you speak to, it's one I spent some -- but again not 18 enough -- time on to this point, and it's the commission 19 issue that the defendants have raised. 11:13:55 20 MR. ABREU: So I briefly looked at 21 the -- some summaries on that Supreme Court opinion. 22 I don't think it's going to change the 23 Court's determination of this case because I think the 2.4 Ninth Circuit case I cite, United States versus Laurenti,

is in line with that case.

11:14:16 25

And it's one that there is no general duty 1 2 to speak, and as the Court pointed out, until you do. 3 And here, if the Government cannot prove 4 that they had a -- that they omitted a material fact 11:14:39 5 after speaking, then, you know, I imagine that they'll be 6 making a motion -- well, they'll probably make a motion 7 anyway for Rule 29 directed verdict, but that would be the appropriate time to argue that, you know, we did not 8 show that that defendant had created a situation where he 9 11:14:59 10 had to reveal this material fact that he was obtaining a 11 50 percent commission. 12 The fact is I think at trial what will be 13 shown is that these defendants asked an investor or asked, you know, any investors as an example to invest 14 \$10,000 to buy X number of shares. It turns out those 11:15:16 15 16 numbers of shares really cost half of what they invested 17 because the other half of what they invested went to pay 18 them. 19 And so simply by stating \$10,000 for 20,000 11:15:32 20 shares, there's your fraud. That's the lie. 21 Were there other lies? Absolutely. Were 22 they using fake names? Yes. Were they misrepresenting 23 the amount, the hold period that they couldn't sell the

There were lots of other

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11:15:46 25

stock in? Yes.

1 misrepresentations, but here the conduct of material 2 omissions in terms of the undisclosed commissions and the 3 kickbacks, certainly illegal. 4 The United States has --THE COURT: Are there -- are there other 11:16:03 5 6 cases or other decisions coming out of other prosecutions 7 on that theory that I should be looking to to see how they handled arguments like the ones the defendants have 8 9 advanced, or is this -- I had a different case where 11:16:23 10 there was a white collar prosecution where one of your 11 colleagues argued there was the first time the Department 12 of Justice has made such an argument so I shouldn't go 13 spend the time? 14 MR. ABREU: No, Your Honor. 11:16:38 15 I've personally charged this offense for 16 the last four years and convicted probably two dozen 17 defendants, including one in this court that the Court 18 accepted a plea from Jason Arthur for this very conduct. 19 There's another case pending in front of 11:16:56 20 Judge Oliver. 21 Several defendants were convicted, pled 22 guilty and were convicted of the same conduct before 23 Judge Pearson. 2.4 And Your Honor has another case with the 11:17:04 25 same undisclosed commissions being paid because this is

1 the issue with hiring Wolf of Wall Street types and 2 bullshit artists is that you have to pay them. And if you tell investors what they're 3 4 actually being paid, they won't invest. And that --THE COURT: Does it make a difference -- I 11:17:23 5 6 suppose this is a question for a jury ultimately -- but does it make a difference if the -- I mean, it seems like 7 your theory turns on the actual fair market value as it 8 were of the stock, the consideration and the transaction being half of what -- you know, the 50 percent sits on 11:17:45 10 11 top of fair market value. 12 But if the fair market value is, you know, 13 100 X, and the commission's being taken out of that, you 14 know, the investor is getting, you know, 100 X of value 11:18:09 15 and the commission's being taken out of what's being 16 delivered on the market side, I mean is that ultimately 17 the factual issue? 18 MR. ABREU: No, Your Honor. 19 I think the factual issue would be what the 11:18:23 20 investor is being told the money is being used for. 21 And if the money is -- if what --22 THE COURT: I guess it's a materiality 23 question. 24 MR. ABREU: Correct. THE COURT: Because if the -- if the 11:18:33 25

1	investor's getting close to fair market value for the
2	consideration paid, then I don't think the investor
3	necessarily cares whether the commission's one dollar or
4	\$10 or \$90 of the hundred.
11:18:49 5	If it's if the investor's actually
6	getting 50, the investor might care a lot.
7	But, you know, again, I don't have the
8	evidence at this point. I have talked about terabytes,
9	but I haven't certainly had them made available to me or
11:19:06 10	even spent any time, if they were, looking at them.
11	So I don't know if if any investor even
12	asked the question.
13	MR. ABREU: Your Honor, that's it's an
14	interesting point.
11:19:18 15	I don't know that I'm prepared to speak on
16	that issue in terms of specificity of what the
17	THE COURT: If you don't speak, there's not
18	going to be a duty.
19	No, I couldn't resist. Sorry.
11:19:32 20	MR. ABREU: Oh.
21	But I think the general point is that they
22	were just told this money is to invest in this company.
23	These investors were, you know, invited to
24	fly out to Cleveland and toured the facility with
11:19:45 25	Mr. Spivak and, you know, had understandings of what

1	their money was supposed to be used for: The company;
2	not paying Mr. Bongiorno, Mr. Arthur 50 percent of their
3	investment.
4	And so, Your Honor, going back to the
11:20:10 5	arguments on Count 1, I wholesale, I think these are
6	arguments that are ripe for, you know, a post-trial
7	motion for a directed verdict, a Rule 29 motion.
8	You know, they're about the sufficiency of
9	the evidence. They have nothing to do with whether the
11:20:27 10	counts are alleged properly.
11	They have the notice that's required by the
12	law, and the Court should deny the motions as they are.
13	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
14	Well, in the interests of time, and I do
11:20:47 15	think I certainly have work to do, I know you could
16	probably go another hour on Count 1, but I do want to
17	turn to Count 2 and there's other motions as well.
18	So if we could turn to Count 2.
19	MS. ENGELMYER: Good morning, Your Honor.
11:21:11 20	Lauren Engelmyer on behalf of Paul Spivak.
21	I will argue our motion to dismiss Count 2,
22	which we filed on behalf of both Paul Spivak and Olga
23	Smirnova.
24	There are three grounds to dismiss Count 2
11:21:27 25	of the second superseding indictment.

1 First, Count 2 should be dismissed because 2 it misrepresents the facts and suggests that there was an 3 error in the grand jury proceedings. 4 Second, Count 2 should be dismissed because the Government entrapped the defendants. 11:21:39 5 And, third, Count 2 should be dismissed 6 7 because it fails to state a claim. First, in Count 2, the Government presented 8 a false reality to the grand jury. Under Federal Rule of 9 11:21:55 10 Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(A)(v), a defendant can move 11 to dismiss an indictment based on alleged errors in the 12 grand jury proceedings. According to the Supreme Court, in Bank of 13 14 Novia Scotia versus United States, dismissal on this 11:22:11 15 basis is appropriate if the defendant can show that the 16 errors substantially influenced the grand jury's decision 17 to indict. I'm going to start with the clearest 18 19 glaring error in Count 2. 11:22:26 20 When you read the overt acts section of 21 Count 2, you would think that on February 15th, 2021, 22 Spivak and Smirnova contacted people to purchase USLG 23 stock and those people just happened to be working with 2.4 the Government. 11:22:40 25 It's written as if on this day, the

1 defendants sought out new co-conspirators to go commit 2 securities fraud. 3 This is completely false, and we know it's 4 false because the Government produced over 50 hours of recorded calls and meetings, undisputed evidence. They 11:22:54 5 6 created the evidence and produced the evidence that tells 7 a different story. 8 Count --THE COURT: So doesn't that decision 9 11:23:06 10 ultimately belong to the jury then and not to me? 11 MS. ENGELMYER: The question of whether 12 dismissal of an indictment is appropriate is an 13 appropriate question for the Court. THE COURT: I understand that. 14 11:23:19 15 But my question is in light of all the 16 evidence you referenced that the Government provided to 17 you convincing you that there's a substantial error or 18 false reality -- however you want to characterize it --19 that gives rise to Count 2, in light of that volume of 11:23:41 20 evidence, doesn't that shift it to being a jury question? MS. ENGELMYER: I don't believe the volume 21 22 of evidence determines that decision. 23 The fact that there is undisputed evidence 2.4 here, and because it is undisputed it's a matter that's

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appropriate for --

1 THE COURT: I think Mr. Abreu is going to 2 dispute the evidence. 3 MS. ENGELMYER: It's evidence that the 4 Government created and produced. And there's no -- there may be disputes 11:24:07 5 6 about how to understand the evidence, but this is not a 7 case where you have to weigh competing testimony or, you know --8 THE COURT: And it sounds like -- and I 9 11:24:21 10 don't mean to skip too far ahead -- but it sounds like in 11 an entrapment sense you're arguing on an objective 12 standard, not a subjective standard, which might be fine 13 in the State of Michigan, for example, but here in Federal Court we use the subjective standard. 14 11:24:38 15 MS. ENGELMYER: That's right. 16 The entrapment claim is based on, yes, an 17 objective standard where the -- as a matter of law, the 18 undisputed record shows that the Government induced the 19 defendants and that they were not predisposed to commit 11:24:57 20 the crime. 21 THE COURT: I quess my point is that there 22 are some jurisdictions that you examine, under an 23 objective standard, whether the defendant was entrapped, 2.4 and that under an objective standard would focus on the 11:25:09 25 conduct of the Government.

1 But that's not the standard under federal 2 law as in Sorrells. 3 MS. ENGELMYER: So I think both standards, 4 though, require an understanding of what the Government 11:25:21 5 did and whether there was a predisposition on --THE COURT: Well, I think the subjective 6 7 standard requires predisposition. And, you know, one of the questions I've 8 had, this starts to take us a little bit far afield so my 9 11:25:35 10 apologies for that, but on the predisposition question, 11 my understanding of federal law -- again I have some work 12 yet to do on this -- is that if you assert the defense 13 and argue it at trial, that the burden rests with the 14 Government to prove predisposition beyond a reasonable 11:25:53 15 doubt. 16 That seems kind of dicey for your client, 17 it seems to me. I mean, that seems to open the door to 18 all sorts of evidence that otherwise would not come in, 19 either strictly under the Rules or simply on a 403 11:26:09 20 analysis. 21 But if you're going to make the argument, 22 it seems like there's going to be some that comes in that 23 maybe Mr. Spivak would not like to come in. 24 MS. ENGELMYER: That's a very good point, 11:26:23 25 Your Honor, and we understand that. And these are, of

1	course, obviously issues, you know, we'll have to address
2	if this does move to a trial but
3	THE COURT: But there's nothing that says
4	you don't make the argument now and not in front of the
11:26:34 5	jury.
6	I'm not suggesting you're charging forward.
7	I'm just trying to some of the issues I've been
8	thinking about and working through.
9	MS. ENGELMYER: Yes, Your Honor.
11:26:43 10	THE COURT: But I interrupted you, sorry.
11	MS. ENGELMYER: No problem.
12	Would you like me to continue on
13	entrapment?
14	THE COURT: Please.
11:26:50 15	MS. ENGELMYER: Or should I go back to
16	THE COURT: Wherever you want to make your
17	argument.
18	MS. ENGELMYER: Sure.
19	So I'll just quickly go through our basis
11:26:58 20	for dismissal of the indictment because the grand jury
21	here was misled.
22	The indictment omits that for three months
23	prior to this February 15th, 2021 meeting, CHS and the
24	undercover agents aggressively pursued Spivak and tried
11:27:16 25	to get him to engage in questionable conduct.

1 It omits that in response to these repeated 2 solicitations, Spivak told the Government's agents that 3 he could only sell restricted stock from a private 4 placement at 15 cents a share and that he could not 11:27:33 5 advertise the stock. 6 Your Honor obviously has our motion papers 7 and the transcripts that we attached as exhibits. 8 appreciate that those exhibits are long, so I actually prepared a chart summarizing those exhibits to aid Your 11:27:47 10 Honor's review, if I may share with Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Anything that aids my review, 12 I'm all in favor of. 13 Thank you. 14 MS. ENGELMYER: So, you know, there's a lot 11:28:07 15 in the recordings, and this is all in the time period, 16 the three months that precede when the Government alleges 17 the conspiracy began. 18 In short, the sting begins when CHS cold called USLG on November 12th, 2020 to ask about investing 19 11:28:28 20 in the company. CHS was told on this and at least 15 21 other occasions that the company was selling in a 22 registered private placement at 15 cents a share and that 23 price could not change. 2.4 CHS devised a scheme to introduce Spivak to

undercover agents posing as wealthy investors.

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1 described these people as "big hitters" and "fixes to all 2 the problems." 3 He lured Spivak, Smirnova and their 4 3-year-old daughter to Florida on February 15th, 2021 and his whole plan for that meeting was to convince Spivak to 11:29:00 5 6 let him promote USLG stock. 7 Spivak protested that he did not need the money right away; he was just concerned about getting 8 9 USLG on NASDAQ as quickly as possible, and that he was 11:29:18 10 not comfortable promoting the stock until he had audited 11 financial statements. 12 After several hours of pressuring on top of 13 three months of aggressive pursuit, Spivak finally agreed 14 to let U.S. -- I'm sorry -- to let CHS market the stock 11:29:35 15 to raise the profile of the company. 16 Based on this evidence which, you know, I 17 just summarized sort of not going into detail on 18 everything, it's clear that Count 2's narrative is 19 inaccurate. It's also critical to point out that there 11:29:46 20 21 are examples of factual allegations in Count 2 that are 22 just wrong. They are directly contradicted by the 23 recordings. 24 First, I'd like to direct Your Honor to 11:30:00 25 Paragraph 46-a of Count 2, which alleges that on February

15th, 2021, Spivak solicited undercover agents to 1 2 purchase stock. 3 But it was just the opposite. That's 4 exactly what the recordings show. Spivak solicited no one, and it was the undercover agents that repeatedly 11:30:19 5 6 asked Spivak if they could buy stock. 7 Second, Count 2 alleges at Paragraph 46-c that on March 10th, 2021, Spivak agreed to have Scott and 8 Church sell shares to an undercover federal agent for 11:30:40 10 25,000 each as a test. 11 It alleges that Spivak stated, after the 12 test transactions, they would negotiate the sale of the 13 remaining six million held by Scott and Church. 14 This is wrong. It was the confidential 11:30:56 15 source, not Spivak, that made those statements. 16 CHS was the one that said that he had a 17 game plan to buy shares from Church and Scott as a test 18 run. 19 In response, Spivak said it would be 11:31:09 20 cheaper to just buy in the market. 21 CHS insisted that they wanted to buy these 22 shares from Church and Scott because if it worked, they 23 would buy the remaining shares. 24 The fact that CHS and not Spivak made these 11:31:24 25 statements matters. It means that Spivak did not do what

1 the Government here alleges. 2 For the same reasons, the allegations that 3 Spivak caused wire transfers from Government-controlled 4 bank accounts to Church and Scott's bank accounts is 11:31:42 5 wrong. He didn't cause anything. 6 Assuming, which we contend is a reasonable 7 assumption, that Count 2 includes the facts that were 8 presented to the grand jury, and the Government does not dispute this, it's clear that the Government presented a 11:31:58 10 false reality. 11 Additionally, it's likely that the 12 Government failed to instruct the grand jury on the 13 affirmative defense of entrapment. 14 These errors satisfy the standard under 11:32:12 15 Bank of Nova Scotia. How could the grand jury accurately 16 assess Spivak's intent to defraud when it was told that 17 Spivak said things that the Government's agent actually said, or without understanding that the Government sought 18 19 to coerce Spivak to commit a crime? 11:32:31 20 The prejudice here is evident. 21 I'm going to move on to our second basis 22 for dismissal, unless Your Honor has any questions before 23 I do that. 2.4 THE COURT: No. Go ahead.

MS. ENGELMYER: So the second basis to

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dismiss Count 2 is entrapment.

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A valid entrapment defense has two related elements, and this is from a Sixth Circuit case *United States versus McLernon*.

First, that the Government induced the crime; and, second, that the Government lacked a predisposition to engage in the criminal conduct.

The Sixth Circuit has held that entrapment may be established as a matter of law if the undisputed evidence demonstrates that the Government agent engaged in conduct which overbears an otherwise innocent person's will and thereby induces him to commit a criminal act that he was not disposed to commit. And this is from United States versus Jones, a Sixth Circuit case from 1978.

So the first element here, the criminal design, originated with the Government. The undisputed evidence in the forms of hours of recorded calls and meetings demonstrates that Spivak and Smirnova were the targets of the Government's repeated efforts over six months to create a crime.

As discussed, the agents tried to get

Spivak to sell outside of the registered placement. The

Government devised the scheme to promote USLG stock, and

worked hard for months to convince Spivak over his

repeated objections.

Finally, it was the Government, not Spivak, that came up with the plan to buy free-trading stock from Church and Scott.

Moving on to the second element, the undisputed evidence shows that Spivak and Smirnova were not predisposed to commit a crime.

The Sixth Circuit generally considers a number of factors. This is also from *United States*versus McLernon. They are the character and reputation of the defendant, including any prior criminal record; whether the suggestion of criminal activity was initially made by the Government; whether the defendant was engaged in criminal activity for profit; and whether the defendant evidenced reluctance to commit the crime.

All of these favors weigh -- all of these factors weigh in favor of the defendants.

First, Spivak and Smirnova have no criminal history. Not only that, but Spivak was investigated by the SEC for this very conduct, and the SEC declined to bring an enforcement action against him.

Second, as discussed above with respect to the first element, the suggestion of criminal activity was entirely made by the Government.

Third, there is no evidence that Spivak

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1 personally profited from any sale of USLG -- USLG 2 securities. 3 The indictment never alleges that Spivak 4 sold any of his USLG stock, and as my colleague pointed out that's because he had over 50 million shares of stock 11:35:33 5 6 and only sold a small portion. 7 Spivak and Smirnova's goal was always to grow the company, its product line, and shareholder 8 9 value. 11:35:47 10 This is supported by the fact that Spivak 11 and Smirnova poured their money into the company to keep 12 it afloat. Spivak quaranteed all of the company's loans. 13 And he deferred his salary during the time of the alleged 14 conspiracy. 11:36:02 15 Clearly any dump would only hurt Spivak and 16 Smirnova. 17 Fourth, as discussed, Spivak and Smirnova repeatedly evidenced a reluctance to commit any crime. 18 19 In addition to the examples I've --11:36:17 20 THE COURT: I guess -- I guess the rub on 21 this one is that, I mean, every entrapment case I've read 22 has that exact same fact pattern where there's an initial 23 reluctance and eventually the defendant gives in. 24 And whether -- whether that turning point 11:36:36 25 suffices under the law, isn't that for the jury here?

1	I mean, a jury might well agree with you
2	that this was all the idea of the Government and they put
3	him up to it, and had they not done this, none of this
4	would have happened.
11:36:54 5	They might well agree with that. But a
6	jury might say these were the halfhearted protestations
7	of someone who was saying and doing the right things
8	until he didn't.
9	MS. ENGELMYER: We appreciate that
11:37:12 10	entrapment is a complicated affirmative defense and often
11	it is a jury question.
12	But the Sixth Circuit has clearly held that
13	it can be established as a matter of law where the
14	undisputed evidence shows inducement and no
11:37:29 15	predisposition.
16	And
17	THE COURT: Is that more appropriate on
18	Rule 29?
19	I'm still working, I haven't had a chance
11:37:39 20	to read all these cases yet, but, I mean, it seems to me
21	that that's probably the procedural posture in which the
22	issues arise or go up.
23	I could be wrong. I haven't read all these
24	cases yet.
11:37:52 25	MS. ENGELMYER: I would have to look into a

1 little bit more closely the exact procedural posture of 2 all of these decisions, but the Sixth Circuit case that's 3 very helpful here, United States versus Jones, clearly 4 says that it's the duty of the Trial Judge to determine 11:38:10 5 whether the evidence is in dispute or whether the 6 question can be resolved as a matter of law. 7 So we think that's appropriately a question for Your Honor. 8 9 And --11:38:21 10 THE COURT: I agree with that. 11 I quess that becomes a question of timing, 12 whether it's on Rule 29 where we have the evidence and 13 the Government has rested, or we're sitting here reading 14 an indictment as it were. 11:38:35 15 MS. ENGELMYER: Right. 16 We understand. We submit this is really a 17 unique scenario, which is that the Government created and 18 produced 50-plus hours of recording which they can't 19 dispute the credibility of that evidence. It's their 11:38:54 20 evidence. 21 So in this situation, that is undisputed 22 evidence that Your Honor can consider whether this is one

of those unique cases where entrapment can be established

You know, in this --

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as a matter of law.

THE COURT: No, go ahead. 1 2 MS. ENGELMYER: I was just going to say, 3 you know, three months of pursuit and coercion, which is 4 all evidence that we can fairly assume was not presented to the grand jury, is critical. 11:39:38 5 And, you know, in sum, the evidence shows 6 7 that the Government sought to entrap these defendants and Count 2 can and should be dismissed on this basis. 8 Third and finally, Count 2 should be 11:39:57 10 dismissed on the independent basis that it fails to state 11 a claim against Spivak and Smirnova for conspiracy to 12 commit securities fraud. 13 I'll note that the Government failed 14 entirely to respond to this argument in its opposition 11:40:13 15 brief, likely because even post-indictment, the 16 Government has not found a theory of securities fraud 17 that is supported by admissible evidence. 18 One would think that if there was a crime, 19 it would be somewhere in the 50-plus hours of recorded 11:40:29 20 calls and meetings. It's not there. 21 Count 2 recites the elements of securities 22 fraud as it does in Count 1, but it never cogently says 23 what illegal conduct the defendants conspired to commit. 2.4 My colleague went through this extensively 11:40:47 25 in Count 1, but, you know, the allegations are similar in 1 | Count 2.

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Count 2 alleges that Spivak and Smirnova solicited would-be promoters to purchase free-trading shares. As discussed, that's just not true.

But even if it were true, it's not fraud to promote your company's stock. There's no evidence that Spivak or Smirnova intended to make false statements, that they did, or that they intended to mislead investors.

Count 2 alleges that Spivak and others arranged to artificially inflate the price of USLG shares by creating and releasing favorable press releases. As Mr. Axelrod said, you know, extensively favorable press releases are not illegal.

There is not a single allegation, despite hours of recorded calls and meetings, that Spivak discussed publishing false press releases, false marketing material. There is just no evidence.

The securities and wire fraud counts associated with Count 2 also fail to state a claim.

I think those arguments are fairly simple and straightforward in our motion, so I was not going to go through those, but I'm happy to if Your Honor would like.

THE COURT: All right. No, I think I've

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1 got my questions on the table, so unless there's anything 2 further on the defense side, Mr. Abreu, happy to have you 3 speak to Count 2. 4 MS. ENGELMYER: Thank you, Your Honor. 11:42:12 5 THE COURT: Thank you. 6 MR. ABREU: Thank you, Your Honor. 7 Well, I guess addressing first the point that we didn't respond to, the fact that Count 2, their 8 9 claim that Count 2 is not a claim, it's the same argument that they made in Count 1. I don't think it's necessary 11:42:34 10 11 to repeat arguments per count. 12 It is a crime to -- you can commit -- you 13 can take legal acts to commit a crime, right? You can 14 mail a piece of paper, that is not illegal. If you're 11:42:55 15 doing it with illegal intent to defraud somebody, to commit a crime, it is a crime. 16 17 So it doesn't matter that they were -- that 18 the press releases were favorable or that they were even 19 If they were released with the intent to defraud 11:43:12 20 and as part of the scheme, then they're relevant to the 21 crime that's at issue. 22 Your Honor, I think to your point on the 23 entrapment issue, one, obviously I'll dispute until I'm 2.4 blue in the face that there was any entrapment because 11:43:27 25 the Government does dispute the evidence or at least the

defense's interpretation of the evidence.

Do we dispute that 50 hours of recording exists? No. Do we dispute what those recordings mean or what the defendant really means when he says certain things in those recordings? Absolutely.

And that's a matter for the jury.

But if after the Government's case the defense makes a Rule 29 motion and the Court finds that, you know, no reasonable juror could make that determination based on the evidence that was admitted at trial, then Your Honor dismisses the count.

That's the correct procedural posture for this, because as is evident with all of these motions to dismiss, this is about evidence, a dispute about evidence and, you know, that the Government didn't precisely lay out exactly what Mr. Spivak did to violate the law, when in fact it has pled sufficiently — and with a lot more detail than it usually does — what the violation was here.

In terms of the defense's argument that the Government's misrepresenting the facts, Your Honor, it's simply not true. We dispute that as well.

But again, I wasn't going to spend a lot of time in a brief arguing facts because this isn't the proper vehicle to do it, and Your Honor should not be put

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in the position of listening to 50 hours of phone calls to determine who's right about what a particular call means and whether Mr. Spivak was predisposed.

If, looking at the indictment in the manner most favorable to the Government at this stage, that the allegations were accepted as true as they are, and we've alleged Count 1 as securities fraud occurring before this period in 2020, that Mr. Spivak committed securities fraud before 2020, then he's predisposed.

There is no real issue as to entrapment relative to this 2020 time frame.

THE COURT: I think one of the concerns, excuse me, I hear from the defense goes back to an issue I asked when we were talking about Count 1, which is cherry-picking of evidence and so on.

If things are taken out of context or the like, you can make -- I think in this election year of all years we know that that lies in our future, but I think we all understand the point, and I think the concern is that that might have gone on or had some bearing on what the grand jury returned.

And so, I mean, I take the point about what is for a jury, what's for Rule 29, but I think here on a motion to dismiss the question is probably more front-loaded and focused on the integrity of those

proceedings.

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MR. ABREU: Your Honor, again the defendants haven't met the bar of establishing that there was irregularity in the grand jury.

This isn't reason to believe that there's irregularity in the grand jury because the law does not require that the Government present the entire picture.

And I'm not saying that we didn't, but there is no requirement that we do that. There's no requirement that we present the grand jury with every self-serving exculpatory statement that a defendant makes.

That's simply not the law.

And obviously, there is a mechanism where, you know, in particular cases where if Judges are concerned about what the grand jury considered, that the Judge could look at the transcripts in camera.

But, Your Honor, I'd submit that here, this is literally throwing everything against the wall to see what sticks. And none of it sticks because a lot of it just is about the evidence and it doesn't really make sense from a legal perspective that, you know, Mr. Spivak was entrapped or that they were simply misled because of the overt acts that the Government chose to include, by starting the conspiracy date on the date that he agreed,

first made the open agreement, the most clear agreement to commit a criminal act.

That it started on that date, and that the overt acts that support that allegation in Count 2 are listed from that date forward does not automatically mean that the grand jury is — has been tampered with or hasn't received the correct legal instruction because, you know, it's obvious that the Government was trying to hoodwink the grand jury to indict Mr. Spivak.

Again, that's just throwing things against the wall without any proof.

And --

THE COURT: Let me make sure I understand your predisposition argument as well.

Is your argument that because of the different time periods charged in Count 1 versus Count 2, that Count 2 comes later, so the predisposition arises from the fact of the earlier acts of securities fraud?

MR. ABREU: Your Honor, I think that's one way to get over that, that bar, or at least one way to show the Court in the legal sense, if accepting the facts of Count 1 as true, then Mr. Spivak is predisposed because he committed securities fraud months before Count 2.

And if he's taking that action in Count 1,

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1 one could infer why the Government approached Mr. Spivak 2 as part of an undercover operation, because of that 3 conduct. 4 Now, I think the defense's response was "The SEC cleared us." Well, that's not what the SEC did. 11:49:50 5 6 They didn't decide to charge you. 7 I can't speak for the SEC. They are on the civil side. I'm on the criminal side. And whatever the 8 9 SEC decided to do, they decided to do. 11:50:06 10 But I think if Your Honor looked at the 11 letter that they sent to Mr. Spivak, they particularly 12 disclaimed any -- making any judgment about whether he 13 committed any kind of violation of law or not. 14 THE COURT: It is a little unusual to see 11:50:21 15 the sequencing between the DOJ and the SEC in this case. 16 Usually you see it go the other way, where on the 17 criminal side you might say, "We're not going to pursue 18 criminal charges because of the proof beyond a reasonable 19 doubt standard, but that certainly leaves you open to 11:50:38 20 civil claims under a lower standard." 21 And here, the SEC exercising its 22 discretion, for whatever reason, not to move forward, I'm 23 not saying it's dispositive or anything, but it does 24 raise an eyebrow.

MR. ABREU: Well, Your Honor, I can tell

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1 you the very simple answer is that the two sides of the 2 house have two very different toolsets and no -- and 3 sometimes do not do parallel investigations. 4 This was not a parallel investigation, and 11:51:08 5 the SEC didn't have access to the information that the 6 United States from DOJ on the criminal side had. 7 Had they, they may have made a different decision. I don't know. 8 9 But we obviously can't share grand jury 11:51:20 10 materials with the SEC, and the SEC doesn't have the same 11 tools that we do. And so different decisions were made. 12 Often there are parallel investigations, 13 and then you see some kind of coordinated action. But, 14 yeah, this one is a little unusual in that. 11:51:40 15 THE COURT: I mean, it's not unprecedented. 16 It's not a unicorn as far as I can tell. It just raises 17 an eyebrow. Returning to predisposition then, I suppose 18 19 if a jury were to acquit on Count 1, your predisposition 11:51:54 20 argument on Count 2 becomes a little bit harder in the 21 face of an entrapment argument made to the jury. 22 MR. ABREU: It would be if Your Honor 23 rejected all of the arguments relative to what's in the 2.4 actual recordings themselves pre-dating that February, 11:52:07 25 2021 date where Mr. Spivak talks about what they did

before with the other people.

I think there's one call that's provided in one of the exhibits where Mr. Spivak actually described Mr. Mallion as, "If you would put Chris Farley in Wolf of Wall Street, you would have the guy that took us public and we made every single mistake along the way. I know now not what to do."

An admission of exactly what they did, dated -- and I believe that that happens, yeah, November of 2020.

There's evidence in those calls, but again not the appropriate time to lay all of that out and, you know, ask the Court to make factual determinations that should be the province of the jury.

But, yes, if we -- if the jury were to acquit on Count 1, and there was no other evidence of predisposition and they, the defense, raised this argument of entrapment and no other evidence was submitted, then, sure, I think it would be a harder bar for the Government to meet.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. ABREU: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: So there's motions to sever.

They're variously called motions to bifurcate, sever,

various other things as well, so I'm happy to hear -- I

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1	do have some questions on this one as well.
2	Happy to hear from whoever wants to speak.
3	MR. AXELROD: Your Honor, there was one
4	other motion to dismiss with respect to Counts 48 and 50.
11:53:59 5	THE COURT: You are correct, and actually
6	Mr. Bongiorno had one on pre-indictment delay so I'm
7	getting ahead of myself here.
8	So my apologies.
9	So let's take up the last two motions to
11:54:08 10	dismiss.
11	MR. AXELROD: Yes. And I'll be very quick
12	on this.
13	We filed a motion to dismiss Counts 48 and
14	50.
11:54:14 15	48 charges a conspiracy to witness tamper
16	through intimidation, corruption, threatening. There's
17	nothing in there.
18	Essentially what the Government is trying
19	to do is criminalize the right to defend oneself by
11:54:27 20	finding witnesses to go talk to the FBI. If you actually
21	look at the indictment itself, it says "Find this person
22	and tell them go talk to the FBI," and that's charged as
23	a conspiracy to witness tamper, which I will get to in a
24	second, but I find that I don't know how a grand jury
11:54:42 25	returned an indictment on that.

1 Of course, the Government did not even 2 respond to our motion to dismiss Count 48 which is 3 I don't know of any rule that would allow the 4 Court to treat the Government as a preferential party, 11:54:56 5 but I know that in a civil case, if a party did not 6 respond to a motion, the substantive motion, a 7 dispositive motion, that motion would probably be 8 granted. 9 Count. 50 --11:55:06 10 THE COURT: Maybe we should change that 11 rule to cut down on the length of briefs, but that's 12 different, different musings. 13 MR. AXELROD: Fair enough. 14 That's Count 50, very similarly, they 11:55:16 15 charge Mr. Spivak with obstruction of justice in 16 connection with an investigation based on the fact that 17 Pretrial Services was going to go search his house for 18 weapons. 19 That's not an investigation. That's a 11:55:30 20 Pretrial Services check review, but the Government paints 21 that as part of an FBI investigation. It's simply not 22 true. 23 And I don't know how also that that got 2.4 charged, but again the Government didn't respond, so we 11:55:42 25 rest on our papers on those.

1	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
2	Did you wish to speak to those issues,
3	Mr. Abreu?
4	MR. ABREU: Yes, Your Honor.
11:55:50 5	The United States, well, my contention is I
6	did respond to those motions as in our response.
7	THE COURT: I'll tell you, I'll be very up
8	front with you, I haven't gotten to these counts in my
9	prep work so I don't know if you have or haven't. I have
11:56:10 10	no view on that one way or the other.
11	What I do recall is the proceedings we had
12	at the beginning well, maybe at 2:00 o'clock in the
13	case, maybe not at the very beginning, but shortly after
14	the beginning of the case.
11:56:22 15	As I recall, there were some issues with
16	rats and alleged witness intimidation, and Mr. Spivak's
17	counsel was really desiring to make a record on that, and
18	we never got to that for various reasons.
19	MR. ABREU: Yes, Your Honor.
11:56:38 20	And I'll the thumbnail sketch is that
21	the Government's response does not address the factual
22	disputes that the defendant makes.
23	The Government's response lays out what is
24	required under the law to allege a crime in Count 1,
11:57:01 25	Count 2, and all the conspiracy counts, Count 1, Count 2,

1 Count 48; two or more persons conspired to commit -- to 2 commit an enumerated crime in Section 1512, and that the 3 defendant knowingly and voluntarily joined that 4 conspiracy. 11:57:17 5 The allegations are made. The manner and 6 means are provided in the indictment. The overt acts 7 taken or the acts in furtherance -- I forget how they are styled -- are laid out, that the defendants believed that 8 9 that is a legal act. 11:57:32 10 The other way to say that is my defendant 11 didn't have -- or my client didn't have the specific 12 intent to commit a crime. 13 That's a factual issue. If I don't prove 14 intent or that he had corrupt intent when he was telling 11:57:47 15 people to put his daughter on the witness's lap to make 16 him feel bad so that he would change his story or talk to 17 the FBI, if that wasn't corrupt, and if the jury doesn't agree with me, then I lose, if there's no other evidence 18 19 that I present. 11:58:03 20 I believe that that was corrupt. 21 In terms of the obstruction of federal 22 investigation, again, Your Honor, the United States

I didn't want to get into an argument with the defense over what the investigation was, but there

alleged what it alleged. It is sufficient.

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1 was just a search warrant at Mr. Spivak's office. 2 Mr. Spivak is concerned with computers that have evidence 3 from the Mallion days being discovered in his house. 4 The search for the guns was a consent search that related back to his detention hearing, but at 11:58:38 5 6 the time the Government was negotiating with former 7 counsel to obtain all the computers and guns in the house. And eventually, that was whittled down to the 8 firearms in the house, and that was what the consent was 9 11:58:59 10 provided for. 11 That's not what Mr. Spivak was aware of 12 when he made that call. 13 So what's the investigation? The investigation of the securities fraud. There was a 14 11:59:09 15 complaint. He hadn't even been indicted yet. That's why 16 I wasn't going to get into a factual dispute about 17 whether there was an investigation or not. That's for the Government to prove. 18 19 If the Government can't prove it, then the Court will Rule 29 it after we rest, and the defendant 11:59:21 20 21 will be happy. 22 That's all I have, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 24 And again, my apologies, Mr. Rosen, 11:59:40 25 regarding the -- I'll call it a pre-indictment delay

1 motion, which I have read. I've been through those 2 papers. 3 MR. ROSEN: Well, I'm going to 4 short-circuit a little bit of this, Judge, because there are certain acknowledgements I'm going to make that will, 11:59:54 5 6 I think, cut through a lot of the arguments. 7 It is an unconstitutional pre-indictment delay motion to dismiss, Your Honor, alleging abuse of 8 9 process and unfair -- the Government's unfair advantage 12:00:10 10 it obtained by way of its conduct in this case. 11 That said, we will acknowledge that this 12 was an effort to cooperate with the Government, and we 13 will acknowledge that this was done at Mr. Bongiorno's 14 request and the Government's open acceptance of that. 12:00:30 15 We acknowledge that Mr. Bongiorno signed 16 these waivers. 17 All of that was done with the belief that 18 the Government was acting in good faith, which it may 19 have been at the time. But what turned this upside down, 12:00:47 20 Judge, in my opinion is a couple of events. 21 One, the nature and the timing of 22 Mr. Bongiorno's arrest. After a year-and-a-half of what 23 I thought were good faith meetings, to have 24 Mr. Bongiorno -- I'm going to segregate, of course, our 12:01:11 25 motion on the argument to suppress from this -- but to

have Mr. Bongiorno arrested -- back up.

Early on in our conversations with the Government, they asked for me to obtain Mr. Bongiorno's passport during the course of our negotiations. And I accepted that and I have it. So the Government was fully aware that Mr. Bongiorno could not and was not going anywhere.

The fact that they chose to arrest him on a Friday afternoon at an airport with his wife and infant child in the Virgin Islands, U.S. territory, knowing that he was going to then spend the weekend in a local jail — which turned out to be quite an event in his life — when all they had to do, after all these communications we've had, was pick up the phone and say, "Listen, we've had enough, we're indicting your client, bring him in Monday morning." Okay.

That triggered concern on my part as to what had been happening all along. We do know that witnesses had been contacted, which I guess is the Government's privilege, but in the course of that, the nature and the conduct of the communications I've heard evidenced to me that this was now becoming a "Let's get as much information as we can from the defendant," the putative defendant.

As the Court just commented, the oddity of

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the SEC long-term investigation -- and Your Honor, I think, appropriately asked all the parties early on "You okay with the same Judge taking both matters," and it was appreciated -- and we were -- that there were issues that had come up in the nature of these communications, very aggressive in the Government's contact of defense witnesses.

You know, Judge, the Government's position on this case and the law is that we need to show specific prejudice. That's the law. And I will concede that my motion has not risen to that level. We haven't.

But that's the reason I've asked for an evidentiary hearing, because I think we can establish that how the Government proceeded, what the Government was doing in the course of these 18 months of negotiations with Mr. Bongiorno, producing the witnesses that the Government has contacted, calling the agents to find out what was really going on, that's how prejudice is established.

And there's no way I can do that without that hearing.

So we believe that while the language in the waivers speak to, well, you're not going to challenge this, underlying all of that is always the Government's acting in good faith.

If they were, and it's established from the 1 witness stand, fine. 2 3 If they weren't, that's how we are able to 4 establish the prejudice. And I think that we have at least risen to 12:04:18 5 6 the level of allowing the Court to have a hearing on how 7 the Government was conducting these -- this inquiry, why it chose to arrest, and how it chose to arrest at that 8 9 moment. 12:04:36 10 You know, Mr. Abreu and I have had many 11 pleasant conversations. I'm not a believer of repeating 12 to any court those conversations. I don't think that's 13 the appropriate way to handle these matters. 14 But to say that I was taken aback by the 12:04:52 15 arrest would be an understatement, perhaps because I 16 was -- had a knee replacement the day before the arrest. 17 It was a busy day for me the next day. 18 So that being said, Judge, I think we have at least risen to the level of being able to have the 19 12:05:09 20 Court conduct a hearing and to find out what was really 21 going on during the course of 18 months of negotiations 22 with Mr. Bongiorno. 23 THE COURT: I quess I'm not sure how a hearing would show prejudice, to analogize to the 2.4 12:05:24 25 discussion I was having with Ms. Engelmyer about the

entrapment issue.

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It might establish some, from your perspective, less than good faith or bad faith conduct on the part of the Government or so forth, but I'm not sure how that rises to the level of prejudice of the defense, which is what I understand the case law in this area to talk about.

I think if the Government were out there, hypothetically, murdering witnesses who were going to testify on your client's behalf, that would be one thing. But I don't think there's any suggestion that anything so shocking would be going on.

But I think prejudice has to go to a specific right. Presumably here it's the right to a fair trial as protected under the Sixth Amendment and Article 3.

So I'm just not sure what, what specific evidence an evidentiary hearing might develop.

MR. ROSEN: Well, so, if it's an unconstitutional delay that the Government was extending the course of these meetings, these discussions, and of course it's -- pardon the nature of my comment -- but then it's sucking more information out of Bongiorno for a purpose that wasn't as expressed.

It wasn't "Let's find a resolution to this

1 case that both parties can agree on," and if it was to be 2 able to contact defense witnesses that they may not have 3 known about, that becomes a question of prejudice, 4 becomes a question of good faith or bad faith, it becomes 12:07:10 5 a question of the Government's intentions. 6 I can't do that unless I've got an agent on 7 the stand to ask those questions. If I got the answers that in my view would 8 9 be acknowledging that we were not just trying to settle 12:07:29 10 this case, but we were interested in being able to talk 11 to the witnesses in an aggressive fashion and a very 12 tainted fashion, Government murder, if you will, by 13 verbosity, it's like, you know, are you aware that this 14 man was doing this, this, this and that. 12:07:50 15 So that's how prejudice is established. 16 It isn't -- like I said, I acknowledge the 17 motion did not get to that place because it really couldn't, but I think if we had that hearing and 18 19 established that there was not good faith, at some 12:08:08 20 point -- it may have started in good faith. 21 But, you know, Judge, I will -- I have the 22 page written down, but the Government indicated in its 23 response, "We determined Bongiorno was lying." 24 Well, then what are we doing? Why are we

bringing him back to resolve the case if you don't

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1 believe what he's saying? 2 My history with that is, "Rosen, you're client's lying, get him out of here and don't come back, 3 4 you know, we'll see you in court." But 18 months' worth of debriefings and 12:08:40 5 6 conversations raises a question of what were they doing, 7 when did it turn, why were they continuing to get information from Mr. Bongiorno? 8 9 And again, I don't think the Court can just 12:08:53 10 ignore this arrest. It was, in my view, an exercise of 11 very bad faith by the Government. All they had to do was 12 call me. So that tip of the iceberg causes me to say 13 14 there's more here that we need to look at. 12:09:11 15 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 16 MR. ROSEN: Yes, sir. 17 THE COURT: Mr. Abreu. 18 MR. ABREU: Your Honor, I have to breathe 19 after reading this motion and listening to that argument 12:09:27 20 because this might be the most offensive motion I've 21 received from a defense attorney relative to, like he 22 said, 18 months of working with him and his defendant, 23 his client, to resolve the case, offering him plea 24 agreements, multiple times, allowing him the opportunity

to meet with my management to -- for declination

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1 presentations, sitting through a 45-minute declination 2 video that they created, and then be accused of acting in 3 bad faith because his client decided to go to a U.S. 4 territory, which pops up on CBP's radar, and if there's an active warrant because there was an indictment issued, 12:10:12 5 6 they arrested him. 7 Did I tell them to arrest him? No. Does it matter? No. 8 You know, is it -- it's not great that he 9 12:10:24 10 was arrested on a Friday and had to hang out in the one 11 prison or the one jail in the Virgin Islands, but guess 12 what? It happens to defendants every day. This isn't personal against Mr. Bongiorno. 13 14 And Mr. Rosen's argument that, you know, 12:10:40 15 he's not going to talk to the Court about lawyer 16 conversations, and then file a motion saying, "I want 17 return of property, which I know isn't properly venued 18 here but Mr. Abreu said it's okay; I just want my cake, I 19 want to eat it, too; everybody did something wrong to me 12:10:59 20 because I wouldn't plead quilty." You were offered a 21 plea. 22 He was offered a plea agreement. 23 declined it. He was told he was going to be charged. He 24 was charged, period.

No evidentiary hearing is needed. This is,

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1	again, this is an unwarranted motion that has no basis
2	and should be denied.
3	Thank you, Judge.
4	THE COURT: All right.
12:11:27 5	MR. ABREU: I don't know if you have any
6	questions.
7	THE COURT: No.
8	All I was going to say, I guess two things.
9	One, since you had made the cake and eat it
12:11:35 10	too, everyone likes cake so I can't blame them, I
11	suppose, in that regard.
12	But beyond that, I was going to say if it
13	helps you take a breath, you should see what comes across
14	my desk.
12:11:46 15	MR. ABREU: I'm sure, Your Honor.
16	THE COURT: Not in this case, don't get me
17	wrong.
18	MR. ABREU: No, I appreciate that, Judge.
19	THE COURT: All right. So with that, then,
12:11:54 20	we can move on to the motions to sever.
21	Again, these are various these are
22	called different things by different people.
23	On this one, Mr. DeVillers, I believe you
24	filed the first one, so happy to hear from you first.
12:12:09 25	MR. DeVILLERS: So, Your Honor, just to be

1 clear, we don't really see any reason to sever out of the 2 case as defendant other than the statements, and this is 3 what we're concerned about. 4 There are clearly about 30 hours of tapes 12:12:29 5 and text messages and even the statements in the 6 indictment, my client had nothing to do with. He wasn't 7 part of these. He wasn't there for them. He wasn't talking to them. 8 So the question is, you know, is 9 12:12:41 10 this -- the argument really is that it was not hearsay or 11 it's an exception because it's a statement of a 12 co-conspirator in furtherance of a conspiracy. 13 THE COURT: I mean, I've read the 14 statements so I understand your argument, and that's 12:12:56 15 fundamentally my question. 16 You, even if you had separate trials, you 17 know, we can talk about that, but, you know, for present 18 purposes we can say we'll try your client first or 19 second, I'm not sure it really matters, don't the 12:13:12 20 statements still come in? 21 MR. DeVILLERS: I don't believe they do. 22 One, they have to show that there was a 23 conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence to show 2.4 that they would come in. 12:13:21 25 THE COURT: I mean, that would be a Rule

1 104 issue, I suppose. 2 MR. DeVILLERS: We could, and that's, quite 3 frankly, I may be expecting some sort of a voir dire or 4 hearing to establish by a preponderance of the evidence 12:13:32 5 that a conspiracy exists. 6 If we just went into it through a trial, I 7 can't imagine -- you know, Mr. Abreu is a fine attorney -- but doing an opening statement without 8 actually discussing these statements that my client 12:13:44 10 wasn't a part of. 11 It's not also that there were 12 co-conspirators' statements. They have to be in furtherance of the conspiracy. And there are a lot of 13 statements that are both in the indictment and there's 14 12:13:55 15 text messages and --16 THE COURT: I don't think they have to be 17 in statements that your client makes in furtherance of a 18 conspiracy. 19 I think the declarant just needs to make

I think the declarant just needs to make the statement in furtherance of a conspiracy.

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So under the conditional relevance, the question would be whether Mr. Spivak making the statements -- I believe he made most of the ones in your exhibit that I've reviewed -- if those were statements that were in furtherance of the conspiracy, you know,

1 that I think they would, you know, ultimately I guess I 2 just, you know, even if we were to sever or bifurcate, try separately under whatever nomenclature, aren't many 3 4 of those statements coming in anyway? MR. DeVILLERS: I think if you found there 12:14:40 5 6 was a conspiracy by a preponderance, yes, some would. 7 But there are some even in our motion, I mean there are statements by Mr. Dean, he's certainly not 8 talking in furtherance of the conspiracy, and he's 12:14:51 10 talking about my client and he's making incriminating statements about my client kind of self-serving to some 11 12 extent that may come in in a trial just with Mr. Spivak 13 to give context to a conversation that wouldn't come in 14 against my client as a furtherance of the conspiracy. 12:15:05 15 So I suppose what, you know, we could -- I 16 agree that it is unlikely these are testimonial 17 statements and that there's a confrontation clause issue, 18 it really purely is an evidentiary issue. 19 And I suppose I can object, but it seems to 12:15:22 20 me that I'll be objecting through opening statements, 21 even if the Court were to find that there was -- there 22 was a preponderance of the evidence suggesting a 23 conspiracy, but there's a lot of these statements that I 2.4 don't agree that are furthering the conspiracy. 12:15:36 25 And that's what I'd be objecting to the

1	point where I'm not sure that we could have, you know, a
2	trial that's not going to be very, very interrupted.
3	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
4	I think I understand your arguments and
12:15:52 5	your position.
6	Bear with me one second.
7	You can have a seat, but bear with me
8	before I turn to a co-defendant.
9	All right. Thank you. And thanks for
12:16:16 10	bearing with me for that moment.
11	I'm pretty sure everyone has filed one of
12	these motions, so I'm not sure who wants to speak next.
13	MS. KELLY: We will, Your Honor.
14	THE COURT: All right. You drew the short
12:16:29 15	straw. Everyone was looking at you.
16	MS. KELLY: Your Honor, my name's Melissa
17	Kelly and I'm with the firm of Tucker Ellis, and along
18	with Mr. McCaffrey I represent Olga Smirnova.
19	I'm talking to you today about the motion
12:16:54 20	to bifurcate Counts 1 and 2 from trial with Counts 48
21	through 50.
22	You know, the standard for that relief
23	is it's in our briefing and I'm sure the Court is
24	familiar with it, as is everyone in this room and it's
12:17:08 25	about preventing prejudice, specifically the compromise

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of a specific trial right or preventing the jury from making a reliable determination as to guilt or innocence.

And the danger that's at the heart of our arguments in this motion is spillover evidence which is, you know, the danger that evidence about one count or one set of counts will cause the jury to make an unreliable determination about guilt with respect to the other counts.

And here that danger is particularly keen because Ms. Smirnova is charged in the first two counts, the first two conspiracy counts, and her conduct is referenced in Counts 48 through 50, but she's not charged in those counts.

And, you know, as you've heard a few people talk about today, the evidence or, excuse me, the allegations in Counts 1 and 2 about Ms. Smirnova are thin. They're thin at best. Mr. McCaffrey talked about that with respect to Count 1.

You can read through Count 2 and see that it relies on a series of recorded meetings that

Ms. Smirnova was at, you know, three of them; she was there with her daughter. She was tending to her daughter.

That's all covered in the briefing, and I know that the Government said a few moments ago that

1 there's a lot, you know, more evidence with respect to 2 the text messages that form the basis for Count 1, but 3 that doesn't necessarily weaken or affect our argument. 4 Our argument still holds because the three final counts invite the jury to conclude that 12:18:35 5 6 Ms. Smirnova engaged in illegal conduct, and that's 7 particularly precarious for her in this case because Count 48 is a conspiracy count against her husband Paul 8 9 Spivak. 12:18:51 10 And in Paragraph 56, Page 40 of the 11 indictment, the Government alleges that Mr. Spivak 12 conspired to construct justice -- obstruct justice, 13 excuse me, with unnamed conspirators, and then it's 14 followed by a discussion of Ms. Smirnova's conduct. 12:19:09 15 And I found it sort of interesting a few 16 moments ago, the Government actually referred to Counts 1 17 and 2 and 48 in the same breath, the conspiracy counts. 18 So I think that demonstrates the sort of, you know, risk 19 that we are talking about here, and that is that --12:19:24 20 THE COURT: Why would a jury instruction 21 not suffice to protect the interests of your client in 22 this regard? 23 I mean, I think that's normally how we deal 2.4 with these sorts of issues. 12:19:38 25 MS. KELLY: Sure. You're absolutely right,

1 Your Honor. 2 And I'm sorry, I didn't know if you were 3 done. 4 THE COURT: Yeah. 12:19:43 5 MR. KELLY: That's absolutely right, and 6 that's certainly the statement that the two cases that 7 the Government cites in response to our argument stand for. 8 9 But I think in this case, the specific 12:19:52 10 danger with respect to a jury instruction is the fact 11 that Count 48 is a conspiracy charge. And it's a charge 12 of conspiracy against Mr. Spivak, and -- who is her 13 husband, my client's husband, and she is also charged 14 with conspiring with him in the first two counts. 12:20:10 15 So the danger is while she conspired with 16 him, you know, in this -- she must be the person who 17 conspired with him or one of them in Count 48 so she must 18 have also conspired with him with respect to Counts 1 and 19 2. 12:20:23 20 And that, that's where the sort of novel 21 danger in this case arises that doesn't quarantee that a 22 jury instruction would prevent the prejudice that we're 23 talking about. 24 And actually, Your Honor, if you look at 12:20:37 25 the cases that we've cited in our brief, they sort of

support that same kind of thinking.

And even the cases, I know we cited a couple of cases where the relief we were requesting was not granted, but that's because those cases, they sort of demonstrate the line between the relief being merited and the relief not being merited.

And I think a good example of that that is particularly applicable to this case is *Emond* or *Emond*. It's a Seventh Circuit case from 1991 that's cited in our brief. It's a RICO case. It was a village manager and his wife. The village manager was charged with numerous offenses involving his misconduct while he was in his position, and he and his wife were both charged with tax evasion, and they wanted to separate the tax evasion counts out.

The District Court denied and the Seventh Circuit ultimately affirmed that decision. But it noted that it thought that the District Court was sort of maybe at the outer limits of its discretion in denying that relief.

And one of the things that the Court said, you know, this is the reason that we aren't finding error here and that is the strength of the counts against the wife, so we aren't so concerned that there was jury prejudice here.

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And that is not, you know, our position, of 1 2 course, is that that doesn't apply because of the 3 thinness of the allegations, at least, against 4 Ms. Smirnova. And that Court also took a moment to 12:21:59 5 6 discuss Ms. -- the wife's, excuse me, the wife's argument that if you do a jury instruction in this instance, you 7 know, first of all, there's always the danger that, on 8 repetition, jury instructions lose their effect, but it 9 12:22:16 10 also said, the Court also recognized the argument that, you know, if the Court's giving these instructions about 11 12 the wife who was alleged to have engaged in behavior or 13 conduct, excuse me, with her husband, and you tell the 14 jury that it can't consider that, it piques its interest. 12:22:31 15 And I think particularly in a case like 16 this one where you have a conspiracy charge in Count 48 17 and two conspiracy charges at the top of the indictment, 18 and the jury's going to, "Well, what's going on, now we 19 got to think about it," and I think that presents a 12:22:47 20 particular danger in this case. 21 THE COURT: Yeah, I understand that 22 concern. 23 That's not been my experience with juries. 24 After every trial, I talk with the jury, it's one of the 12:22:55 25 two best parts of the job, and they take the instructions

1	pretty seriously in my experience.
2	MS. KELLY: Sure.
3	And I certainly wasn't denigrating, you
4	know, what juries do.
12:23:05 5	THE COURT: No, I didn't hear you to be
6	saying that.
7	I'm commenting more on the argument itself,
8	and I didn't take you to be denigrating.
9	MS. KELLY: Oh, okay. Thank you, Your
12:23:13 10	Honor.
11	But I think in particular in this case,
12	because and I don't mean to sound like a broken
13	record, but we've got conspiracy with husband and wife at
14	the end and conspiracy with husband and wife at the top,
12:23:23 15	and I think that that creates a situation where a jury
16	might potentially give less heed to the Court's
17	instruction about this issue.
18	THE COURT: I'm still working through the
19	arguments on these various motions and thinking about
12:23:38 20	them and the like.
21	So I'm going to ask you a question and
22	don't take it as this is, like, where I'm going or
23	anything. It's just something I've been kicking around,
24	and let me get your thoughts on it.
12:23:51 25	It's occurred to me that one way to deal

1 with this issue would be to try these counts separately 2 which would be to say we'll have one jury, because I 3 think the Seventh -- I'm sorry -- the jury trial right in 4 the Sixth Amendment and under Article III is for one 12:24:11 5 jury. 6 So we would just simply -- I don't -- if we 7 go down this path we'd have to talk about what the jury -- what the proof would look like on these counts, 8 9 but it doesn't strike me as, you know, as an evidentiary 12:24:22 10 matter; we're talking about three additional days on 11 these counts or anything. 12 I think you would have a jury come back, return whatever verdict it returns, Counts 1, 2, and the 13 14 related substantive charges, and then say, "Ladies and 12:24:36 15 Gentlemen, one more thing we need you to do. 16 "We've got a couple more witnesses we need 17 you to listen to, you'll be out of here tomorrow," or 18 whatever the time frame is, and then try these counts 19 separately. 12:24:45 20 That seems to me at least -- I'm kicking 21 that around. There might be some practical 22 considerations in terms of witness availability and so 23 There might be some other issues I'm not thinking forth. 2.4 about. I'm sure there are. 12:25:00 25 But it seems to me that there's no

1 prejudice to your client or any others in that world. 2 MS. KELLY: Well, I can tell Your Honor 3 that one of the cases that we cite in our brief, Moore 4 from the Northern District of Michigan, that's exactly 12:25:13 5 what the Court did. 6 That case, I mean it was really different 7 circumstances. One of the counts was a felon in possession, and the other counts were unrelated to that. 8 And so the Court had the trial on the substantive other counts, and then it had, same jury, a trial on the felon 12:25:24 10 11 in possession. 12 So that's certainly something that would be 13 within the Court's discretion to do. 14 And, you know, in terms of the prejudice 12:25:33 15 that we're concerned about, so long as, you know, 16 evidence about Ms. Smirnova's conduct as alleged in 17 Counts 48 through 50 didn't come in --18 THE COURT: I mean, presumably it wouldn't 19 come in on the other counts. 12:25:49 20 MS. KELLY: Sure, Your Honor. 21 And that actually goes to the Government's 22 second argument which is a 404(b). The Government says 23 in its brief that evidence about Ms. Smirnova's conduct 2.4 with respect to those final three counts will be 12:26:01 25 admissible to show consciousness of quilt, intent and

1	knowledge. That's on Page 14 of their brief under
2	404(b).
3	It doesn't really develop that argument,
4	and I think it might be because the Government would be
12:26:12 5	hard-pressed to do that.
6	The conduct that's at issue in Counts 48
7	through 50, they just don't have any bearing on those
8	issues with respect to conspiracy to commit securities
9	fraud. They happened while her husband was in detention.
12:26:26 10	They relate to that issue.
11	I'm not certain how, you know, recorded
12	conversations with her husband where he's telling her,
13	you know, "Make sure that the agents who are coming to
14	search our house can find the weapons," and she's telling
12:26:40 15	him, you know, "Let's wait to see what your attorney
16	says, let's do what your attorney says," have any bearing
17	on the issues that make other acts evidence admissible
18	under 404(b).
19	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
12:26:56 20	MS. KELLY: Thank you, Your Honor.
21	THE COURT: Other, other defendants?
22	Mr. Rosen?
23	MR. ROSEN: Yes, sir.
24	Maybe three trials in front of the same
12:27:23 25	jury.

1	Your Honor, we are moving for a severance,
2	a relief from prejudicial joinder under Rule 14 for
3	between Counts 1 and Count 2 along with substantive
4	Counts 8, 9, 10, 29, 30, 31, 32 and 33.
12:27:45 5	Those are the substantive counts of either
6	transactions or wire, wire fraud.
7	And, Judge, as I think through my argument
8	to the Court on this, I'm going to ask Your Honor to have
9	both the practical aspect of my argument in front of
12:28:07 10	twelve jurors and the legal side to this issue because I
11	think in certain ways they are sort of inseparable.
12	How is a jury going to be able to
13	conceivably distinguish between evidence where a
14	defendant is not charged but a charging document
12:28:30 15	incorporates into the Count 2, where Mr. Bongiorno is not
16	charged, allegations, and then the jury is supposed to
17	hear all of this?
18	So there's a practical and a legal approach
19	to this.
12:28:43 20	THE COURT: Well, why isn't I have the
21	same question.
22	Why isn't a jury instruction at the end of
23	the day sufficient to protect Mr. Bongiorno's interests
24	in front of a jury on that?
12:28:58 25	MR. ROSEN: Well, because it's impossible.

1	It's I respect this Court's statement
2	that a jury does follow and I reference <i>Bruton</i> in my
3	case not for the confession aspect of it, but if I may
4	just turn for a moment to my notes on that the effect
12:29:23 5	of a nonadmissible declaration cannot be wiped from the
6	brains of the jurors. Every piece of evidence pertaining
7	to Count 2 will be virtually identical, if not identical.
8	THE COURT: It's a different time period.
9	MR. ROSEN: But-for the time period.
12:29:48 10	THE COURT: I mean, that's a pretty
11	important difference.
12	MR. ROSEN: It is.
13	THE COURT: I mean, I think I think a
14	jury would understand time travel.
12:29:54 15	MR. ROSEN: So here's my here's my
16	response then because that is the singular distinction.
17	Now I'm going to go to the practical side
18	of this. If these folks are going to be taking notes, or
19	not and just listening
12:30:10 20	THE COURT: I allow them to take notes.
21	MR. ROSEN: Yes, sir.
22	I've given up objecting to that.
23	THE COURT: You can object. It's
24	overruled.
12:30:19 25	MR. ROSEN: Fair enough.

1 Because the same witnesses, the same 2 allegations, the incorporation of Paragraphs 26, 27, 29, 3 33, 34, 35, 38 and 41 are incorporated into Count 2, 4 which Mr. Bongiorno is not charged, and overt acts FF, GG, HH, II, JJ, KK, NN, OO, RR and EEE. 5 12:30:58 6 THE COURT: We're going to have to talk to 7 the U.S. Attorney's Office about that numbering system. MR. ROSEN: Seventeen different criminal 8 allegations of fraudulent conduct are being introduced in 9 12:31:24 10 this trial having nothing to do with Chris Bongiorno. 11 Seventeen criminal, different criminal 12 allegations in the same case where he is charged in 13 virtually identical conduct, and you're going to ask this 14 jury to remember, to notate the distinction and dates, I 12:31:50 15 think puts an undue pressure and undue practicality. 16 THE COURT: Well, in addition to the jury 17 instruction, doesn't trial practice protect your client 18 on that in the sense that -- and I don't know how -- I 19 mean, you're all going to have to try your cases if we 12:32:08 20 have, you know, one or more trials or however that all 21 unfolds remains to be seen, but for the sake of argument 22 here, I would assume at trial -- again it's your case, 23 it's your client, you can do what you want -- but I would 24 assume that when there's a witness on the stand, you're 12:32:23 25 going to stand up and cross-examine the Government's

witness and emphasize, as long as I'll let you do it, you know, to the jury that this doesn't have anything to do with your client on Count 2.

And so now you have the jury instruction reinforcing what they sat through, you know, for a day, a week, two weeks, whatever it is, and they're remembering you doing that, they're checking their notes, they're seeing that, and they have the jury instruction.

I guess I think about all of that, and I wonder why that doesn't accomplish what you're seeking to accomplish through the motion.

MR. ROSEN: Because I think the Court is asking more than the human brain, the human juror sitting in a courtroom is going to be able to accomplish.

It's -- if there was a distinction in the nature of the allegations -- and, Judge, just as an example because it doesn't affect me -- if you were to look at the obstruction counts which I have not moved to sever, and you say "Now, Ladies and Gentlemen, these counts, this evidence is not coming against

Mr. Bongiorno, he's not charged in this count," and then the Government produces its obstruction evidence, you have a very clear ability, a clear line of information that's going into a jury's head.

But two points. One, it's so identical

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1	that I think asking the juror to remember and to
2	segregate, I mean are we going to stop every witness and
3	say, "Now, this question only pertains to 21 and 22; not
4	19"? That's not going to happen. It's just going to
12:34:07 5	come in.
6	And they are going to be assessing the
7	culpability of four individuals. Their job is to assess
8	each person's guilt or innocence, the Government's proof
9	as to each person's guilt or innocence, and then
12:34:24 10	segregate out from the same witness the time parameters
11	when, in fact, the conduct's going to be alleged the
12	same.
13	But more than that, and I think this may be
14	the legal side to this argument because the Court's
12:34:36 15	asking me about the practical side: This indictment is,
16	in my judgment, fatally flawed because of how it
17	incorporates into Count 2 the previously described
18	paragraphs that is going to go back to the jury.
19	I mean, it's not evidence, but they're
12:35:03 20	going to have this indictment.
21	THE COURT: I don't know about that.
22	I actually haven't ever sent an indictment
23	back
24	MR. ROSEN: Okay.
12:35:11 25	THE COURT: to the jury.

1	I mean, I'm open to doing that if
2	MR. ROSEN: Well, my experience is Courts
3	have done that.
4	THE COURT: Subject to discussion.
12:35:22 5	MR. ROSEN: And again to my point
6	THE COURT: I also haven't tried an
7	indictment that's 60 pages long, so there's a first time
8	for everything.
9	MR. ROSEN: It's a lot, Judge. It's a lot
12:35:34 10	of allegations. It's a lot of conduct. And that sort of
11	bleeds into my observation of I don't think it's
12	possible.
13	I mean, look at the <i>Bruton</i> case. They
14	basically are acknowledging there are some things that
12:35:46 15	just cannot be reasonably expected of a juror. And
16	because not only do the allegations in Count 1 get
17	incorporated into Count 2, but the testimony's going to
18	be identical.
19	THE COURT: Just so I'm clear, what you're
12:36:02 20	seeking in your motion is to try Count 1 and Count 2
21	separately?
22	MR. ROSEN: Yes, sir.
23	THE COURT: Yeah. Okay.
24	As I understand it, it just read large on
12:36:12 25	the defense side. We have every we have every motion

1	just about every which way.
2	MR. ROSEN: Let me see if there's
3	THE COURT: That's good. I just want to
4	check them all off.
12:36:23 5	MR. ROSEN: That's fine.
6	THE COURT: They're on my criminal
7	procedure bucket list.
8	MR. ROSEN: I had cited two Sixth Circuit
9	cases. Let me just summarize each of them.
12:36:35 10	THE COURT: Sure.
11	MR. ROSEN: The <i>Soto</i> case, which is on
12	Page 3 of my motion, they look to the following to
13	determine improper prejudice: Was the evidence
14	intertwined; similarities and differences between the
12:36:49 15	evidence; the strength of the Government's case; and the
16	ability to separate the evidence.
17	I'm the first to acknowledge the obvious
18	which is it's a different time frame, but it's asking the
19	jury to, every time it hears a sentence from a witness
12:37:06 20	about an event, to segregate as to each of these
21	allegations, for I don't know how many weeks, these two.
22	And I think when they get back to that jury
23	room, it's going to be, "When was that again?" And I
24	would expect them to write down the date of each line of
12:37:25 25	testimony and when that comes in because they're so

1	identical.
2	The other the other case I cited was the
3	Davis case. Joinder is not prejudicial, not prejudicial,
4	if, had two counts been tried separately, the evidence on
12:37:40 5	each count would have been admissible in the other trial.
6	None of this evidence is admissible against
7	Mr. Bongiorno as to Count 2 because it is a separate
8	date, but the ability of a juror for a period of weeks to
9	hear the same witness talk about the same acts and then
12:38:02 10	expect them to be able to, in the back when they're
11	deliberating, bring back a fair and reasonable verdict,
12	we're never going to know.
13	Not that the Court couldn't instruct them.
14	I just think it's to my first point, it's going to be
12:38:17 15	impossible.
16	Thank you, Your Honor.
17	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
18	MR. AXELROD: Your Honor, if I could just
19	briefly address the last severance argument.
12:38:22 20	THE COURT: Sure.
21	MR. AXELROD: We did not file a motion to
22	sever on behalf of Paul Spivak.
23	THE COURT: I was mistaken.
24	MR. AXELROD: No, we did not.
12:38:28 25	We did not.

1 But --2 THE COURT: Did you move to join all of the 3 other ones? 4 MR. AXELROD: We did not do that either, of course, because I'm hoping, and I believe that the motion 12:38:35 5 should be dismissed, but -- the motion should be granted 6 7 and the case should be dismissed. But today and hearing Mr. Abreu and, in 8 9 fact, a question Your Honor asked raises a really 12:38:48 10 important point. If the Government seeks to establish 11 predisposition for Count 2 based on Count 1, that creates 12 a significant problem for Mr. Spivak. 13 Sixth Circuit jury instruction 2.01A is 14 about separate consideration for a single defendant charged with multiple crimes. And of course, you know 12:39:07 15 16 this, it instructs the jury that each count is to be 17 considered separately. 18 However, if Your Honor charges -- if Your 19 Honor tries Counts 1 and Counts 2 together, the 12:39:20 20 Government will be arquing, "Jury, you should convict on 21 Count 2 because of what Mr. Spivak did on Count 1, 22 because of predisposition," which will go against the 23 jury instruction, the pattern jury instruction, which 24 will allow the Government to buttress Count 2 because of

Count 1, and then, of course, they'll buttress Count 1

12:39:38 25

1	because of Count 2.
2	
	So it's just a lot of bootstrapping, which
3	I think is improper.
4	I think the cleanest thing to do is to try
12:39:48 5	Count 1 altogether. Every defendant here is involved in
6	that case should the Government should Your Honor
7	decide not to dismiss it, which I think you should.
8	And then of course, dealing with the
9	practicalities of that, if Mr. Spivak is convicted on
12:40:01 10	Count 1, of course the predisposition argument, I'm not
11	going to prejudge it, but probably goes away for Count 2.
12	However, the flip side is if he's
13	acquitted, it probably also goes away.
14	So it's a very clean way of avoiding
12:40:19 15	significant spillover prejudice between Count 1 and Count
16	2 for Mr. Spivak, and potentially gaining efficiencies
17	for the Court.
18	Thank you.
19	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
12:40:28 20	Mr. Abreu.
21	MR. ABREU: Thank you, Your Honor.
22	Your Honor, just because I'll probably
23	forget what I was going to say, I'll address that last
24	point first.
12:40:40 25	The Government isn't going to try to prove

1 that Mr. Spivak was predisposed to commit a crime with 2 Count 1 unless they raise the defense that he was 3 entrapped and he's not predisposed, and we have to do 4 that. Right? 12:41:02 5 That's what your Honor was warning them 6 that they would be inviting a problem for themselves if 7 they were to raise this defense, and they should consider that. 8 9 That's a problem that they would create. 12:41:11 10 That's not a -- the two counts can stand on 11 their own. The evidence is sufficient for both counts. 12 But if they say that Mr. Spivak is not predisposed to 13 commit securities fraud, then the evidence from Count 1 14 rebuts that. But that's something that they would 12:41:31 15 invite. That would be an invitation on their part. 16 Going back to Mr. Scott, Mr. Scott's motion 17 relative to the statements made by Mr. Spivak, you know, 18 I think what that really boils down to is a 403 argument, 19 that the statements are so prejudicial that they, you know, outweigh any probative value, and then I think it's 12:41:54 20 21 a premature stage to consider that. 22 I think that's a motion in limine issue. 23 And I don't think that the statements are unduly 2.4 prejudicial. They are prejudicial. Every piece of 12:42:12 25 evidence that I'm going to introduce against the

1	defendants is prejudicial.
2	THE COURT: I would hope so.
3	MR. ABREU: Right.
4	THE COURT: Otherwise, I would question
12:42:19 5	whether it's relevant.
6	MR. ABREU: Right.
7	But the question is is it so unduly
8	prejudicial when a co-defendant is making statements in
9	furtherance of the conspiracy?
12:42:27 10	If there are disputes about that and
11	particular statements, I think that that's better handled
12	closer to trial in a motion in limine, and can be
13	addressed either by the Court excluding particular
14	statements or certain kinds of redactions.
12:42:45 15	The Government has done that in other cases
16	for Bruton issues.
17	It doesn't require severance for the
18	defendant.
19	Relative to Mr. Bongiorno, actually I'll go
12:43:07 20	back to Ms. Smirnova because I think she was she was
21	the second defendant to her argument was second. I
22	guess hopefully I can cure the prejudice right now and
23	say that I will tell the jury that she is not a
24	co-conspirator in Count 48.
12:43:24 25	She wasn't charged in that count because

1 she clearly told her husband, "Kevin Spellacy said not to 2 talk to that quy, I don't want to talk to him, I don't 3 want to say anything to him, you shouldn't say anything 4 to him, you shouldn't have people say anything to him." 12:43:41 5 That's why she wasn't charged, she's not a 6 member of that conspiracy. 7 I don't -- now, the Count 50 issue about the computers and why the -- her knowledge of the 8 9 computers is probative is because she knows what a 12:43:54 10 computer from the Richard Mallion days contains, evidence 11 of securities fraud. 12 That's why it's relevant. 13 But I have no intention of asking the jury 14 to convict or try to confuse the jury into convicting Ms. Smirnova with a crime she didn't commit. 12:44:14 15 16 She was -- I actually, when I listened to 17 that jail call, I applauded for her because I was like 18 she's a lot smarter because she's following, you know, 19 Mr. Spellacy's advice. 12:44:26 20 And that's important because Mr. Spivak 21 plows right through that, says, "Okay, okay, yeah, I'll 22 listen to that," and then makes a call two minutes later 23 to Anthony Corpora telling him to go talk to the witness 24 again. 12:44:41 25 I think the jury is not going to be

1 confused. I think that if anything, it's to 2 Ms. Smirnova's benefit to show that she did not commit 3 that crime. 4 And as to Mr. Bongiorno --12:45:03 5 THE COURT: I mean, I suppose the risk 6 there is a jury hears a statement of one defendant who 7 happens to be married to another, and to kind of Mr. Bongiorno's point doesn't, in the course of a lengthy 8 9 trial, doesn't draw these fine lines, and I take your 12:45:31 10 point, but they may not see it the same way you do. 11 They may say that, "We don't -- we don't 12 like what Spivak is saying here, for example, and, you know, they're a married couple so, you know, they rise 13 and fall together." 14 MR. ABREU: That would -- that would 12:45:46 15 16 require them to do something illegal because the Court 17 would be giving an instruction for them not to do that, 18 and I don't think that the legal standard is that we 19 would presume that the jury is going to disregard the 12:46:03 20 Court's instructions and the evidence that's going to be 21 presented at trial that's going to be clear, and 22 counsel's arguments. 23 I know it doesn't matter what I say right 24 now and that anything I say at trial isn't evidence, but 12:46:19 25 there's -- we're not running from the facts on this.

1 There's ample evidence to convict Ms. Smirnova of Count 1 2 and Count 2, and she did the right thing with respect to 3 Count 48. 4 I have no issues telling the jury that, and I don't think they are going to be confused or hold it 12:46:37 5 6 against her that her husband plowed through and did that 7 anyway. THE COURT: What about trying Count 1 and 2 8 9 separately? I mean, they're different time periods. 12:46:52 10 They're complicated financial transactions with a lot of 11 wire transfers and recordings and so forth. 12 And in terms of just keeping the evidence 13 straight and keeping the jury focused on what's in front of them, why not try those separately? 14 12:47:10 15 I appreciate that there's some efficiency 16 issues there, but I mean if we're being honest about it, 17 this is not the most efficient dispute resolution system 18 in the world, so there's other values. 19 But why not try them separately? 12:47:24 20 MR. ABREU: Well, I mean, that's a fair 21 point, Judge, because I think I haven't decided how the 22 Government's case, we would present a case, but typically 23 based on the way we've charged this case, we would be 24 presenting evidence on Count 1 first and then we would

switch to Count 2 where we generally try to be very clear

12:47:43 25

1	about which count we're introducing evidence on,
2	especially at opening and how we organize our witnesses.
3	Do I think that but I don't think that
4	we need to, you know, submit all the evidence on Count 1,
12:48:03 5	stop, have a verdict, proceed on Count 2, stop, have a
6	verdict, and then continue to the rest of the counts.
7	THE COURT: Well, might that not be more
8	efficient in some way? I mean, it's possible.
9	I mean, you all are far closer to both the
12:48:22 10	facts and where your respective clients are at, but it's
11	possible if the jury returned a verdict one way or the
12	other on Count 1, that we don't need to try the rest.
13	It might be that there's pleas or it might
14	be that DOJ walks away from Count 2 or just, you know,
12:48:37 15	maybe the defendants don't maybe it doesn't matter any
16	more. Maybe, you know, if the predisposition issue goes
17	away, I don't know, anything can happen.
18	You give a jury a day off and come back and
19	maybe they don't need to come back.
12:48:54 20	I mean, I'm just thinking out loud. I
21	don't have a view.
22	MR. ABREU: Right.
23	THE COURT: Like I said, I'm working
24	through these issues.
12:49:00 25	MR. ABREU: Your Honor, I thought about the

1 same issue with respect to the obstruction counts, so 48, 49 and 50. 2 3 THE COURT: Right. 4 MR. ABREU: If we were to do the case that 12:49:12 5 way. 6 I think, although not my preference to do 7 it that way, I think that, you know, that is probably, out of all of the arguments that have been made by 8 9 defendants, that's probably the one with the most merit. 12:49:25 10 THE COURT: That's high praise from where 11 you sit. 12 MR. ABREU: But again, I don't think it's 13 necessary because I don't think the defendant, the other 14 defendants are going to be prejudiced by it. 12:49:40 15 But I think that separating Count 1 from 16 Count 2 would present different kinds of issues because 17 when would jeopardy attach, right? 18 So if the jury came back with a not quilty 19 on Count 1, not that I would do this, but the United 12:49:57 20 States may dismiss without prejudice Count 2 just to 21 refile it because I want a different jury. 22 I could see, you know, that could be 23 something that would happen. I don't think that's fair 24 to the defendants. I don't think that's particularly 12:50:15 25 efficient or what is intended in our criminal justice

system.

12:51:48 25

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You know, if we're going to have one jury, then we would want one jury to decide all of the issues. But if we sort of take it piecemeal, it would be problematic because different rights wouldn't attach all at the same time presumably because that trial for Count 2 wouldn't have started. And maybe it's not me sitting up here for the Government who — and it's someone, you know, who just wants to win, and they make a different decision, or, you know, it unfairly pressures a defendant to plead guilty when they otherwise wouldn't.

You know, I could see a host of issues that would be problematic by separating out the counts like that.

THE COURT: There's nothing but difficult issues on every side.

You know, when you sale the ship between Scylla and Charybdis, that's what you face.

MR. ABREU: True, Your Honor.

Thankfully, I don't believe most of this is difficult. But I do see some merit in the obstruction argument by moving that out, but the fact is Ms. Smirnova wasn't involved in the conspiracy to -- you know, she's not a co-conspirator in Count 48. That can be explained to a jury without a problem.

1	I don't think there's really any prejudice
2	there.
3	And everything else can be cured by a jury
4	instruction. I mean, as to Mr. Bongiorno, the
12:51:59 5	incorporation of his name in allegations in an indictment
6	that doesn't go back to the jury, I mean there's not
7	going to be any evidence presented to them that he was
8	involved in any conduct from 2020.
9	It's it would have no prejudicial effect
12:52:15 10	on him, and so there isn't a reason to separate a trial
11	for him or have a separate trial for him.
12	Thank you, Judge.
13	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
14	I believe we're down to one, one last
12:52:38 15	motion.
16	Did you need a break? All right. Why
17	don't we our court reporter is requesting a break so
18	why don't we take it's 12:50. Why don't we take a
19	10-minute break?
12:52:52 20	We're down to one motion, so we're knocking
21	them out.
22	We'll resume shortly. Thank you.
23	THE CLERK: All rise.
24	(Recess taken.)
13:15:10 25	THE COURT: Please be seated.

1	All right. So now that we've had our
2	break, we're good for another three hours on the last
3	couple motions.
4	MR. ROSEN: I'll stay under that time,
13:15:21 5	Judge.
6	THE COURT: It's a high bar.
7	All right. Go ahead.
8	MR. ROSEN: All right, Your Honor. This is
9	on DE 287, Mr. Bongiorno's motion to suppress.
13:15:29 10	On July 7th, 2023, at the U.S. Virgin
11	Islands St. Thomas airport Mr. Bongiorno was arrested.
12	I've listed several times what he was
13	carrying. I don't need to do it again.
14	It's from the face sheet of my pleading.
13:15:51 15	Upon information and belief, and I think I heard from the
16	Government today, that the arrest was based upon the
17	return of the second superseding indictment which is what
18	I had assumed.
19	And again, further based upon information
13:16:07 20	and belief, Judge, as I stand here today, there was no
21	probable cause to search to seize any of the items
22	based upon criminal conduct at the time. He was merely
23	going to the airport to come to Miami.
24	I think maybe Ft. Lauderdale, actually.
13:16:27 25	There were no exigent circumstances.

1 Certainly no consent, and to my knowledge no search 2 warrant. 3 And further, no probable cause to believe 4 that evidence was contained in the items that he was -- evidence associated with this case was obtained in 13:16:41 5 6 the items he was carrying. 7 Judge, the indictment in this case, the last overt act, the last day of the alleged Count 1 8 conspiracy, as best I could tell, was September 24th, 13:17:02 10 2019. The last overt act by Mr. Bongiorno was 2016. 11 So if we were to take the end of the 12 conspiracy, by my count, 1,182 days had passed between 13 the date of the close of the criminal conduct and the 14 date of the seizure of the items at issue. 13:17:27 15 So there can really be no serious argument 16 asserting a causal connection between the crimes charged 17 and the seizure of these personal items. 18 And because his wife was standing there, he 19 could have, had he been given the opportunity, to give to 13:17:45 20 her all these items that the Government took. 21 The Government's response to the motion, as 22 I try to assess it, my sense was a greater degree of lack 23 of clarity is hard to imagine. 24 The Government's response was the 13:18:14 25 Government has not accessed the user-generated -- let me

stop. Let me back up a second.

So as to -- before we get into the content of this, as to the seizure itself, Judge, in my view it is a hard stop at that point. They have no legitimate basis then or today to have taken or retained these items, but they have.

And so I think there is some hard questions that the Government should answer today to this Court such as what, what was the basis for the initial seizure? Why was it taken? Because all of this, I think it will help the Court assess where do we go from here.

Was there a search warrant obtained for the seizure of these items? I don't know. Who seized these items and why? I think these are questions the Government should answer to assist the Court in determining where we go.

And from that moment when it was taken without any legal basis to do so, the Government should have returned these items. And I'll just direct the Court to docket entry 249, the defendant's notice of discovery request, wherein we filed a demand for the return of these illegally seized items.

No response.

So in response to our motion to suppress, the Government states that it intends -- "As the

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13:19:29 15

13:19:47 20

13:20:08 25

Government" -- I'm sorry, let me read the whole sentence. 1 "After counsel for defendant Bongiorno and 2 3 the United States discussed the defendant's 4 motion" -- and this was done in private between Mr. Abreu and myself -- "it is his understanding," Mr. Abreu's 13:20:27 5 6 understanding, "that defendant intends to withdraw the 7 motion, as the Government has not accessed the user-generated content of the devices and has no 8 9 intention of using anything from his seized 13:20:46 10 device/devices in this case, even if it had." 11 My response to that was if, if the items 12 had been taken and held in a locker and stayed there, and the Government said, "Look, we're not going to use this 13 14 in this case, no one has looked at it, no one has touched 13:21:15 15 it, no one has done anything with it, here's the chain of 16 custody," all that information, I don't think the motion 17 to suppress would be well-founded because it was 18 untouched. 19 And I would have then filed a motion for 13:21:28 20 return of illegally seized property, meaning you can't 21 hold that which you shouldn't be allowed to have because 22 you took it unlawfully. 23 But that wasn't the response. The response 24 was, as I just read it. "The Government has not accessed

the user-generated content." And I'm not even sure I

13:21:45 25

1	know what that means except they well, let me
2	finish "of the device and has no intention of using
3	anything from his seized devices in this case, even if it
4	had."
13:22:01 5	To me, this means the items have been
6	seized without a warrant or probable cause, and the
7	devices have been opened.
8	That's what this says. The devices have
9	been opened.
13:22:15 10	So I think the second question that the
11	Court needs to ask, after finding out what the basis was
12	for taking it and by whom and why, is what's happening to
13	that.
14	Mr. Abreu's response, essentially,
13:22:32 15	acknowledges that it's been opened.
16	All the Government had to say was, "I found
17	out that these items were seized. I told them to lock it
18	up, leave it there. No one's touched it. Now, let's
19	deal with it."
13:22:50 20	But that's not what the Government says, so
21	I think we need to find out what's happened.
22	Because then the question becomes if
23	somebody has opened it, why, based upon what lawful
24	authority, and what have they done with it?
13:23:05 25	There's a pending criminal case.

1	This seems to insinuate that there may be
2	another investigation, but what's the lawful basis for
3	that? Hence, my motion for return of illegally seized
4	evidence.
13:23:23 5	THE COURT: My recollection is that this
6	issue was discussed one time previously, and I believe
7	and I don't know if the record is the same, we'll hear
8	shortly that Mr. Abreu indicated that at trial, the
9	Government had no intention of using any evidence from
13:23:39 10	any of the devices.
11	If that remains true, then the question I
12	have regarding the motion to suppress doesn't necessarily
13	bear on the motion to return the property.
14	But with respect to the motion to suppress,
13:23:52 15	would there be standing to raise the motion?
16	And I think technically under the law it's
17	a standing question, although I think as a matter of
18	Federal Courts' practice it's probably more of a
19	justiciability issue than standing.
13:24:09 20	MR. ROSEN: If the Government has opened
21	this device, I think the Court's obliged to find out what
22	it is that has happened since then.
23	It isn't necessarily let me back up.
24	We have information, Judge, that this
13:24:36 25	device was at least on, if not opened, in Puerto Rico on

1 July 14th, 2023, seven days after it was seized. 2 We believe that based upon this device's 3 information -- when I say "this device," Judge, let's be 4 clear. There were two phones. There was a laptop. There were documents. There was a voice recorder. 13:25:04 5 That's what was seized, so I do not know what has been 6 7 opened and looked at. Mr. Bongiorno and Mr. Bongiorno's wife's 8 9 Apple ID has been accessed and subpoenaed. Bank records 13:25:22 10 have been subpoenaed. Google records have been 11 subpoenaed. All of this following a grand jury 12 indictment. 13 So if the Government has been in that 14 device and the Government has accessed information, I 13:25:39 15 think this Court needs to be sure that, in fact, none of 16 this information has gotten into this case. 17 And I accept Mr. Abreu's representation, 18 all right. But I think, based upon what a continuing 19 investigation -- if that investigation -- if there is a 13:26:00 20 continuing investigation by Mr. Fry, as an example -- and 21 I don't know that that's the case; he's been the case 22 agent in this case from the beginning -- what has -- what 23 has -- what information is it that they've obtained? 24 How are they going to not use that in this 13:26:17 25 case? What --

1	THE COURT: I guess from the standpoint of
2	the first motion regarding this issue, I'm not sure I see
3	it any differently than any item not turned over in
4	discovery.
13:26:30 5	Right?
6	Like presumably, if the Government intends
7	to introduce evidence at trial or moves to do so and it
8	hasn't it's not part of those two to four terabytes, I
9	assume everybody on this side of the room is going to
13:26:46 10	jump up and raise, you know, any number of complaints to
11	high Heaven.
12	I would have no intention of allowing that
13	evidence.
14	So I'm not sure, you know, to go back to my
13:26:56 15	original question, if the Government is not I'm not
16	sure I even need to get into this issue from an
17	evidentiary standpoint.
18	And is it, whether you call it standing or
19	something else, if the Government is not, in fact, going
13:27:09 20	to be using any data removed from any device that was
21	seized with or without a warrant and so forth, does
22	that I mean, what is there really for me to decide if
23	they're not going to do that?
24	MR. ROSEN: I think there needs to be
13:27:24 25	certainty that that's the case.

1 And it isn't necessarily -- Judge, it isn't 2 necessarily a document. I mean, it's information. 3 That's just as much of a piece of evidence obtained that 4 could have lead them to learn something. 13:27:40 5 So my best answer to the Court is it 6 is -- it is if there is no evidence that came from those devices, the Court then does have to go to were the 7 devices lawfully taken in the first place. 8 9 That again is the full stop for me. 13:28:03 10 After that, in terms of the motion to 11 suppress --12 THE COURT: Well, I guess -- I guess from 13 the motion to suppress standpoint, let's assume for the 14 sake of argument that the devices were unlawfully seized, 13:28:17 15 in fact you can even assume that they were unlawfully 16 searched as well, if the Government is not seeking to use 17 any information from that and we have proper assurance of 18 that, I mean why, why is there a motion that I need to 19 decide? 13:28:31 20 MR. ROSEN: If -- my question back to me, 21 what is a proper assurance? Okay. That's, to me, the 22 question. 23 And if a document has not been turned over 2.4 to me that came from that device, my response back would 13:28:50 25 be is that enough. Because if there's information that

1 was obtained, again, for example, how do we know if an 2 agent associated with this case has looked at something 3 and how do we know that that information didn't allow 4 them to ask a witness a question? That's the same thing. It isn't just a 13:29:06 5 6 document. 7 So I don't know how -- I mean, I understand the Court's question. I mean, it's plainly apparent. 8 9 But how do we determine, unless we hear 13:29:20 10 testimony, who has accessed it, who hasn't seen it? 11 I mean, if Agent Fry takes the stand and 12 says, "Listen, there was a Chinese wall set up and 13 everybody associated with this case has not had one iota 14 of viewing of it," all right, fine. 13:29:39 15 I mean, that's the adversarial process at 16 issue, right? Then we move on to the next motion which is 17 18 return of the evidence. 19 But I need to know that. I need to know 13:29:51 20 that nobody associated with this case has looked at it; 21 who the agents were that did look at it. I mean, I think 22 we need to know what happened to it. 23 And then I think the question is, that's 24 suited to the Court, okay, now I've heard and I can 13:30:06 25 determine that the motion is unnecessary because it has

-	1	not impacted this case whatsoever.
2	2	But I don't think the fact that a
	3	document alone is not going to resolve it. It is the
2	4	issue and the information and what was done with that.
13:30:19	5	And the only way to determine that is by
(6	finding out who has accessed it and what's happened with
-	7	it.
{	8	Then I think the Court's question becomes a
Ç	9	more appropriate one.
13:30:29 1(O	THE COURT: In terms of returning the
11	1	property, then what's the right venue for that?
12	2	My understanding of the law, I'll tell you
13	3	I spent a couple days on this a few years ago. The law
14	4	was not real clear, I'll confess, but my best read of it
13:30:47 15	5	was that motions for return of property are separate
16	6	civil actions that are best brought where the property
1	7	is.
18	3	It's kind of a quasi in rem proceeding, if
19	9	you will.
13:31:00 20	O	MR. ROSEN: There's actually a criminal
21	1	rule, I think I cited to, which does state let me see
22	2	if I can get the Court the rule.
23	3	THE COURT: Is it 41(g)?
24	4	MR. ROSEN: I think (g).
13:31:10 25	5	THE COURT: And motion filed in the

1	district
2	MR. ROSEN: Yes.
3	THE COURT: where the property was
4	seized.
13:31:12 5	So
6	MR. ROSEN: And it says okay. And
7	again, you know, not to include conversations that we
8	had, but I felt and I did think about it before I said
9	it that it was agreed to and appropriate that if we
13:31:28 10	filed this motion, that the Government had agreed that it
11	would be appropriate to have it here because it's all
12	connected to this one case.
13	So if they're withdrawing that, then
14	they're withdrawing that.
13:31:43 15	THE COURT: You don't want to make a trip
16	to the Virgin Islands?
17	MR. ROSEN: Virgin Islands? As long as
18	there's no outstanding warrant for my arrest, I'm good to
19	go.
13:31:52 20	So anyway, Judge, the issue is, as I spoke
21	to you about the motion to suppress.
22	And then if we reach that motion for
23	return, I think the Court has the authority to conduct a
24	hearing here, and I think it would be appropriate to do
13:32:09 25	so.

1	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
2	MR. ROSEN: Sure.
3	THE COURT: Mr. Abreu.
4	MR. ABREU: Thank you, Your Honor.
13:32:16 5	Just briefly.
6	There's no legitimate basis for this
7	motion. There's no evidence to suppress.
8	Mr. Rosen is asking for relief that the
9	Court can't grant. There's no evidence being introduced.
13:32:33 10	You know, at the beginning of his statement
11	"Mr. Abreu's word is good enough," and then, "No, now we
12	need a hearing so I can ask questions of every agent
13	about things that don't pertain to this case."
14	There's a reason the Rules are set up the
13:32:49 15	way they're set up, and suppression motions require
16	evidence that's supposed to be introduced.
17	If there's if there are materials that
18	the Government needs to turn over, according to Rule 16
19	it will do that when it has it. And so that's that is
13:33:13 20	the reason that we argued that the motion is moot.
21	We indicated such at the last pretrial.
22	And I will talk about the conversations I had with
23	Mr. Rosen because he's an officer of the Court and I took
24	his word for it when he said if you just, you know, put
13:33:28 25	it in writing that you guys haven't looked at the phones,

1 I'll dismiss the motion. 2 Okay. So we did that. We haven't looked 3 at the user data. 4 You know, Mr. Rosen wants a criminal 13:33:43 5 justice system that answers to him about every 6 investigation that the Government has. He's looking for 7 an answer to a question he knows, because he told the Court that we've subpoenaed Apple iCloud accounts and 8 we've subpoenaed other information. 13:33:59 10 And if subpoenas were issued and they 11 weren't trial subpoenas, it's a grand jury subpoena, it's 12 likely there's another investigation. 13 That's not a secret because I told 14 Mr. Rosen that the last time we talked. So there's -- and he knows what the 13:34:12 15 16 investigation is about because it's conduct that his 17 client brought to us and said, "Well, I wasn't doing 18 anything wrong," and he lied about it. 19 And that's why we stopped negotiating with 13:34:32 20 him, because he would not be a credible witness even if 21 we did what he wanted to do and gave him a -- gave him a 22 pass and didn't charge him. He was lying to us then. 23 He knows the conduct that he's engaged in, 2.4 but it's a separate matter. It's not before this Court. 13:34:54 25 If he wants the return of property, you

1	know, I guess that is what I took issue with is, you
2	know, on one hand, you know, not we try to be cordial
3	in this business, especially amongst lawyers, and I know
4	that's important to the Court, but what's particularly
13:35:14 5	frustrating is this kind of scenario where then it
6	becomes, you know, at this point everything has to be in
7	writing.
8	And, you know, I don't like for things to
9	devolve to this level, but, you know, this motion to
13:35:34 10	dismiss or, I'm sorry, the motion to suppress, you know,
11	isn't proper here.
12	And the motion to return property isn't
13	properly venued here. And even if it were, he would need
14	to file a new civil action to have the property returned.
13:35:53 15	And then, you know, that Court, even if it
16	was related and it came back to Your Honor, we'd have to
17	talk about what the reasons were that it was seized and
18	go from there.
19	But it has nothing to do with this case.
13:36:08 20	It has nothing to do with these other defendants. And so
21	the motion should be denied.
22	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
23	As best I can tell, that's all of the
24	pending matters.
13:36:36 25	So I have additional work to do. I do

1	appreciate your arguments that are helping focus me and
2	clarify some of the issues and things I need to be
3	working on.
4	So thank you, all, for that.
13:36:50 5	I will get you a ruling as promptly as we
6	can.
7	I know we have a schedule pending. I'm not
8	sure offhand what our next date is, but I'll get you a
9	ruling promptly, and we will move the case forward,
13:37:05 10	assuming there's counts that are not dismissed.
11	And if there are, we'll figure out what the
12	schedule looks like, what the case looks like after the
13	ruling.
14	So thank you, everyone.
13:37:17 15	Are there other matters we should address
16	before we adjourn for the day?
17	Mr. Abreu for the United States, anything
18	on your agenda?
19	MR. ABREU: Your Honor, just a procedural
13:37:27 20	issue.
21	How does the Court I've had different
22	experiences in different courtrooms with respect to bond
23	violations.
24	Do you does the Court prefer motions
13:37:38 25	being filed with the Court, or that information being

1	passed to Pretrial and receiving the information that
2	way?
3	THE COURT: Well, I think that I'm aware of
4	one report that came back from Pretrial, and I was going
13:37:51 5	to take that up today, but immediately after we adjourn
6	this proceeding with the appropriate counsel.
7	So don't go anywhere.
8	MR. ABREU: Okay. But that wasn't it
9	wasn't anything specific.
13:38:01 10	It was just a
11	THE COURT: In general.
12	MR. ABREU: In general.
13	THE COURT: I generally get reports from
14	the Probation Office or Pretrial Services in this case.
13:38:08 15	MR. ABREU: Okay. Thank you, Judge.
16	THE COURT: Anything else on the defense
17	side?
18	MR. AXELROD: Nothing, Your Honor.
19	THE COURT: All right.
13:38:15 20	MR. McCAFFREY: No, Your Honor.
21	MR. DeVILLERS: No, Your Honor.
22	THE COURT: All right. Well, we are
23	adjourned.
24	Why don't we take a short break, and then
13:38:23 25	we'll reconvene on the separate matter?
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	1	Those of you who aren't affected are free
	2	to go.
	3	Thank you.
	4	THE CLERK: All rise.
13:38:32	5	(Proceedings concluded at 1:38 p.m.)
6	6	
	7	CERTIFICATE
	8	I certify that the foregoing is a correct
	9	transcript from the record of proceedings in the
1	. 0	above-entitled matter.
1	.1	
1	.2	
1	.3	
1	4	/s/Susan Trischan
1	.5	/S/ Susan Trischan, Official Court Reporter Certified Realtime Reporter
1	. 6	7-189 U.S. Court House
1	.7	801 West Superior Avenue Cleveland, Ohio 44113 (216) 357-7087
1	. 8	(210) 337-7007
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